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SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS AND THE FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT CLAUSE: REDUCING AMERICA TO THE LOWEST
COMMON DENOMINATOR

RENA M. LINDEVALDSEN*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the legal and policy implications that arise
when a state that expressly prohibits recognition or enforcement of
any rights arising from a same-sex relationship is confronted with a
request to register and enforce a child custody order issued by another
state that gives custody or visitation rights to a biological mother’s
former same-sex partner. As more states confer marital rights to
same-sex couples, this issue will occur with increasing frequency. The
first reported case in the nation to address the issue, Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, has garnered attention from the national media,
including a cover story in the Washington Post Magazine and, most
recently, a feature story in Newsweek Magazine. The underlying issue
arises from two seemingly conflicting federal statutes, both passed
pursuant to Congress’s authority to prescribe what effect, if any, a
foreign judgment should have in another state. In 1980, Congress
passed the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), which
requires a receiving state to give full faith and credit to another state’s
custody or visitation order. In 1996, however, Congress passed the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which expressly recognizes
the right of each state to refuse to give full faith and credit to any
orders arising out of same-sex relationships treated as marriage.
Thus, when a court in Vermont, Massachusetts, California, or New
Jersey (to name a few) declares a woman to be a parent to her former
same-sex partner’s biological child and grants a visitation or custody
order in her favor when the relationship between the women ends,
are other states required to give the order full faith and credit as a
result of the PKPA, or can states refuse to give it full faith and credit
pursuant to DOMA? This Article discusses the various arguments
raised on both sides of the issue in the context of the Miller-Jenkins
litigation. It then articulates a workable standard for interstate custody disputes arising out of same-sex relationships that gives proper
* Associate Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. Associate Director,
Liberty Center for Law & Policy. Special Counsel to Liberty Counsel. J.D., magna cum
laude, Brooklyn Law School. This author would like to thank her family for the sacrifices
made to allow her to write this Article and to represent in court the three mothers who
are discussed in this Article.
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respect to the constitutional mandate to give full faith and credit to
sister state judgments while preserving state sovereignty over core
domestic relations matters.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO INTERSTATE LITIGATION: THE
THREE CASES AND TEN LIVES INVOLVED
A. Charisma R. v. Kristina S.
B. A.K. v. N.B.
C. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins
II. HOW A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE PKPA AND DOMA
UNDERMINES STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER CORE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS MATTERS
III. PRESERVING STATE SOVEREIGNTY: A PROPER INTERPRETATION
OF THE FFC ACT, PKPA, AND DOMA
A. History of the PKPA and DOMA
B. Federalism Demands Respect for State Sovereignty Over
Child Custody Matters
1. There are No Federal Interests Sufficient to Justify
Usurping State Control over a Core Domestic
Relations Matter of Who is a Parent
2. The Enforcement Exception to the Full Faith and
Credit Requirement
C. Relevant Canons of Statutory Construction
D. Unconstitutional Orders Cannot Be Given Full Faith and
Credit
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
While it is fair to state that the question of whether same-sex
relationships should be legally recognized has been discussed indepth and at-length by the legal academy, one question that has not
garnered nearly as much attention is whether a state can refuse full
faith and credit to child custody orders that arise out of same-sex
relationships. Whether through single-parent adoption, same-sex
adoption, assisted reproductive technology, or self-insemination with
a known sperm donor, there is an increasing number of couples who
are raising children while in a same-sex relationship.1 When those
1. Doctors Note Increase in Same-Sex Couples Using IVF to Start Families, REUTERS,
Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS191801+04-Dec-2007+PRN
20071204 (“[P]hysicians at the Reproductive Science Center (RSC) of New England say
the number of same-sex couples seeking assisted reproductive technologies has been on
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relationships end, custody battles often ensue.2 Depending on the
a significant and steady increase.”); see also Associated Press, Married With Children:
An Option for More Gay Men (Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.aol.com.au/news/story/Married
-with-children-an-option-for-more-gay-men/835161/index.html (“[Dr. Jeffrey] Steinberg
says inquiries from gay men to his offices [for fertility and surrogacy services] have increased 30 percent in the past six months.”); Kathy Barrett Carter, To Be Gay, Separated
and Seeking Custody: Courts Wrestle with One Fate of Same-Sex Parenting, STAR-LEDGER,
Oct. 24, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 7180154 (stating there has been an increase in
gay couples adopting as a result of cases giving more parental rights to homosexual
parents’ gay partners); Nicole Martin, Most Sperm Donor Children to Be Fatherless,
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, July 31, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1558918/Most
-sperm-donor-children-to-be-fatherless.html (“Lesbians and single women are on course
to become the largest group to have donor insemination . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692, 695-96 (Cal. 2005) (upholding
the stipulation naming Lisa as a legal parent despite Kristine’s motion to vacate the
judgment); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 677, 682 (Cal. 2005) (granting parental rights to
a lesbian who donated eggs to her former lesbian partner despite signing acknowledgment
forms of a waiver of legal parentage upon donating ova); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117
P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (granting parental rights and responsibilities to the biological
mother’s former lesbian partner); Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 333,
336-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (remanding the case for consideration to determine the presumption of parenthood by concluding whether the partner seeking rights held the child
out as her own and the child was conceived with the intention that it would be raised by
both partners); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. App. 2004) (granting former samesex partner joint parenting time and decision-making authority over objection of fit,
biological mother); Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 3, 7, 16 (Del. 2009) (concluding that former
same-sex partner did not have standing as a de facto parent to petition for custody
because she was neither the biological nor adoptive parent and did not satisfy statutory
requirements to establish presumption of legal parentage); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736
So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (denying non-parent in same-sex relationship
parental rights because psychological parent lacked parental status equivalent to biological mother); In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(refusing to award visitation to former same-sex partner due to lack of standing); King v.
S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 966-67 (Ind. 2005) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal for summary
judgment against former same-sex partner and remanding for lower court to determine
any visitation rights the former partner may have with respect to her former partner’s
biological child); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 11, ¶ 15, 845 A.2d 1146, 1151-52 (finding
that once a court determines non-parent in a same-sex relationship to be a de facto parent,
the court is free to award parental rights over biological parent’s objections); McGuffin v.
Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to allow deceased
mother’s former same-sex partner to challenge biological father’s custody rights or gain
visitation rights); Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821-22, 824 (Minn. 2007) (citing
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000)) (upholding both the constitutionality of a third
party visitation statute and the lower court’s granting visitation to a third party who stood
in loco parentis over parental objection); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000)
(holding that once an individual is found to be a psychological parent, “he or she stands
in parity with the legal parent”); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding coparenting agreement between a lesbian couple may be enforceable); Beth R. v.
Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507-09 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (concluding that biological
parent equitably estopped from cutting off former same-sex partner’s custody and visitation rights); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the
best interest of the child standard shall apply whenever custody is sought, regardless of the
relationship of the recipient of custody to the child); In re Bonfield, 97 Ohio St. 3d 387,
2002-Ohio-6660, 780 N.E.2d 241, at ¶ 35 (rejecting a claim that the same-sex partner
was a parent for purposes of entering shared parenting agreement); Rubano v. DiCenzo,
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state where the same-sex couple lives, one or both of them may be
treated as a parent to the child.3 If the state issues an order granting
custody or visitation to the former same-sex partner, what obligation,
if any, does a sister state have to afford full faith and credit to that
custody or visitation order? Litigation over that exact question is
pending in several state courts.4 The results are far-reaching: if sister
states are required to give full faith and credit to custody and visitation orders granting parental rights to a former same-sex partner
over the biological parent’s objections, then the policy decision of a
handful of states to change the longstanding tradition of family and
marriage, in effect, becomes the law in all fifty states as each state
confronts a request for full faith and credit.
Part I of this Article will introduce the full faith and credit issues
raised by interstate custody disputes between former partners in
same-sex relationships where one of the partners is the child’s biological parent. This part will highlight three cases that represent
varying fact patterns that have arisen.5 In the context of one of those
759 A.2d 959, 975 (R.I. 2000) (stating that a de facto parent has parental rights in limited
circumstances, in spite of Troxel); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 919 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999) (rejecting biological mothers’ former same-sex partners’ claims to visitation and
concluding that “Tennessee law does not provide for any award of custody or visitation
to a non-parent except as may be otherwise provided by [its] legislature”) (emphasis
omitted); Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 635-36 (Tex. App. 2003) (rejecting
same-sex partner’s claim for visitation because in loco parentis is temporary and ends
when the child is no longer under the care of the person in loco parentis); Jones v. Barlow,
2007 UT 20, ¶ 22, 154 P.3d 808 (“[A] legal parent may freely terminate the in loco parentis
[sic] status by removing her child from the relationship, thereby extinguishing all parentlike rights . . . vested in the former surrogate parent.”); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
2006 VT 78, ¶¶ 45-47, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951 (concluding that the rationale behind
granting a former same-sex partner acting in loco parentis custody over opposition of
biological parent applies equally to visitation); Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498, 501
(Va. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming lower court’s holding that former cohabitant failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that denial of visitation would harm child); In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (holding that “a de facto
parent stands in legal parity with” a biological parent).
3. See Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Sacrificing Motherhood on the Altar of Political
Correctness: Declaring a Legal Stranger To Be a Parent Over The Objections of the
Child’s Biological Parent, 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 16 & n.107, 17 & n.108 (2008-2009)
(listing those courts that have, and have not, treated third parties as parents and laying
out a constitutional framework to determine whether a third party can be treated as a
parent). The question of whether one or both of them should be treated as legal parents
to the child is beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough discussion of whether a
state must give full faith and credit to a same-sex adoption, see Lynn D. Wardle, A
Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV.
561, 569-71 (2005) [hereinafter Wardle, Critical Analysis].
4. See discussion infra Part I (discussing Charisma R. v. Kristina S., A.K. v. N.B.,
and Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins).
5. See infra notes 6-33 and accompanying text (discussing Charisma R. v. Kristina
S.), notes 34-58 and accompanying text (discussing A.K. v. N.B.), and notes 59-93 and
accompanying text (discussing Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins).
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cases, Part II will introduce the controlling, and seemingly competing, policies of full faith and credit, on the one hand, and state sovereignty, on the other. This part will briefly lay out the legal arguments
advanced by the parties and the decisions rendered by the courts in
those cases. Part III will explore the various issues implicated by the
full faith and credit obligation and articulate a workable standard
for interstate custody disputes arising out of same-sex relationships
that gives proper respect to the mandate to give full faith and credit
to sister state child custody determinations while preserving state
sovereignty over core domestic relations matters.
I. THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO INTERSTATE LITIGATION: THE THREE
CASES AND TEN LIVES INVOLVED
A. Charisma R. v. Kristina S.6
Charisma and Kristina began dating in California in July 1997
and moved in together in August 1998.7 In January 2002, they registered as domestic partners with the State of California.8 Later that
year, Kristina became pregnant by artificial insemination with sperm
from an anonymous donor.9 Her daughter Amalia was born in April
2003.10 “Amalia was given a hyphenated last name, which was a combination of Charisma and Kristina’s last names.” 11 Charisma did not
adopt Amalia even though California permitted second parent adoption by a same-sex partner.12 In July 2003, when Amalia was three
months old, Kristina moved out of the home with Amalia.13 At that
time, Kristina ended virtually all contact between Charisma and
6. 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
7. Id. at 333.
8. Id. At that time, pursuant to AB 25 and 26, a registered domestic partner was
treated as the spouse of a taxpayer for purposes of: (i) several state tax deductions relating
to medical care and health care costs; (ii) certain unemployment benefits; (iii) maintaining
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress; (iv) second parent adoption;
(v) governmental health care coverage upon death of partner; (vi) health care decisions;
(vii) sick leave; (viii) disability benefits; and (ix) certain probate matters. Assem. B. 25,
2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001); Assem. B. 26, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
It was not until January 1, 2005, through AB 205, that California afforded domestic partners the same rights and benefits as married couples. Assem. B. 205, 2003-04 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2003).
9. Charisma R., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 333.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. (detailing the facts Charisma asserts in support of her claim for a parental
relationship); see also Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 558, 565-66 (Cal. 2003)
(permitting same-sex couples to use the second parent adoption statute).
13. Charisma R., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 333.
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Amalia.14 On July 21, 2003, a termination of domestic partnership
was filed.15
In May 2004, Charisma filed a petition in California to establish
a parental relationship with Amalia.16 In that petition, she stated
that she and Kristina had “decided to have a child together with the
intention that they would both be the child’s parents.” 17 In October
2004, the trial court denied the petition, holding that under thenexisting California law, Charisma lacked standing to bring the action
under the Uniform Parentage Act.18 In denying standing to Charisma,
the trial court relied on three California Court of Appeals decisions,
each of which held that a former same-sex partner lacking a biological
connection to a child could not establish a parent-child relationship
with the child under the Uniform Parentage Act.19
Almost a year later, Kristina moved to Texas.20 Two months
later, in unrelated litigation, the California Supreme Court held for
the first time that a child could have two mothers without the use of
second parent adoption,21 and that the paternity22 presumption — used
in determining a child’s father — must “apply equally to women.” 23
Specifically, the court held that California law should apply to a
woman in a same-sex relationship the presumption that a man is
14. Id.
15. Notice of Termination of Domestic Partnership, No. 10700 (filed July 21, 2003).
16. Charisma R., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 333.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also Uniform Parentage Act, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-01 (West 2004).
19. Charisma R., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 334; see also West v. Super. Ct., 69 Cal. Rptr.
2d 160, 160-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (former same-sex partner lacked standing as parent
under Uniform Parentage Act); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (same); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (same).
20. Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 32-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
21. Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 572 (Cal. 2003). Second parent adoption
“refers to an independent adoption whereby a child born to [or legally adopted by] one
partner is adopted by his or her non-biological or non-legal second parent, with the consent of the legal parent, and without changing the latter’s rights and responsibilities.”
Id. at 558 n.2 (quoting Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting For Same-Sex
Couples in a Brave New World, 20 J. JUV. L. 1, 5 (1999)).
22. Paternity is defined as “the relation of a father.” NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1163
(8th ed. 2004) (“The state or condition of being a father . . . .”). “Presumption of paternity”
and “presumption of maternity” are separately defined, reflecting the inherent differences
between a mother and a father. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1225.
23. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 666-67 (Cal. 2005) (citing In re Karen C., 124
Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). Prior to the August 2005 decision, the court
had explained that “[t]he ‘parent and child relationship’ is thus a legal relationship encompassing two kinds of parents, ‘natural’ and ‘adoptive.’ ” Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776, 779 (Cal. 1993). In that case, the court refused to declare the surrogate a mother
over the objection of the intended parents. Id. at 777-78, 787. It was not until August 2003
that the court declared that a mother could consent to a second parent adoption by her
same-sex partner. Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 572.
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the “natural father” of a child if “[h]e receives the child into his home
and openly holds out the child as his natural child.” 24 In that decision, the court specifically stated its disapproval of the three Court
of Appeals’ decisions cited by the trial court in Charisma’s case.25 In
light of the California Supreme Court ruling, the Court of Appeals remanded Charisma’s case to determine, consistent with the California
Supreme Court’s August 2005 decision, whether Charisma was a
presumed parent and, if so, whether this was an appropriate action
in which to use scientific evidence to rebut the presumption that
Charisma was Amalia’s parent.26
By order dated December 27, 2006, which was more than one
year after Kristina moved to Texas with her daughter, the California
trial court declared Charisma to be a legal parent to Amalia pursuant
to the paternity presumption.27 The court cited three reasons, based
on contested facts, for its conclusion that this was not “an appropriate
action in which to rebut” the parentage presumption: (i) Charisma
participated in the child’s conception with the understanding that she
would be a parent; (ii) after the child’s birth, Charisma voluntarily
assumed parental responsibilities for the short time the three lived
together; and (iii) no one else claimed to be the child’s second parent.28
By order dated May 8, 2008, the trial court issued an order concerning child custody and visitation.29 In that order, the judge granted
Kristina sole legal and physical custody of Amalia, who was then
five years old, and ordered the parties to meet with a court-appointed
psychologist to begin the reunification process between Charisma
and Amalia.30
Kristina, a Texas resident since summer 2005,31 faces the question of whether Texas courts, despite a state defense of marriage act
24. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666-67 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2004)).
25. Id. at 670-72.
26. Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 336-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). The
court explained that presumed parent status depended upon affirmative findings that
Charisma received Amalia into her home and openly held Amalia out as her natural child.
Id. at 336.
27. Reporter’s Transcript of Reasons for Judgment at 10, 14, Charisma R. v. Kristina
S., No. HF04153838 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2006).
28. Id. at 10-14. In Elisa B., the Supreme Court explained its decision to declare that
a child could have two mothers by emphasizing the importance of two parents to provide
emotional and financial support. 117 P.3d at 669.
29. Statement of Decision and Ruling on Issues of Child Custody and Visitation,
Charisma R. v. Kristina S., No. HF04153838 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. May 8, 2008).
30. Id. at 14-15.
31. Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 32-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
Kristina became a Texas resident nearly one year after the trial court held that Charisma
lacked standing to seek parental rights, two months before the California Supreme Court
held for the first time that a child could have two mothers without the use of second
parent adoption, and nearly eighteen months before the trial court, on remand, declared
Charisma to be a parent to Kristina’s child.
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and constitutional amendment,32 will permit Charisma to register
and enforce the California custody order in the state of Texas. If it
does, Kristina could be forced to give visitation to Charisma, a woman
with no biological or adoptive relationship with the child and who
has seen the now-six-year-old child only twice since she was three
months old.33
B. A.K. v. N.B.34
In 1998, N.B. became pregnant by artificial insemination from
an anonymous sperm donor.35 She gave birth to a child in California
in April 1999.36 At that time, only N.B. (the child’s biological mother)
was listed on the birth certificate as a parent to the child.37 N.B. and
A.K. lived together for five years, acting as “co-parents” to the child.38
In March 2004, the relationship between N.B. and A.K. ended, and
N.B. left the shared residence with her daughters.39 In August 2005,
N.B. moved with her children to Alabama.40 One month later, shortly
after the California Supreme Court issued its decision in three companion cases holding that the paternity presumption should apply
32. In its constitution, Texas declares that “[m]arriage . . . shall consist only of the
union of one man and one woman,” and that “[t]his state or a political subdivision of this
state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.” TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 32. By statute, Texas defined “civil union” as “any relationship status other
than marriage that: (1) is intended as an alternative to marriage or applies primarily to
cohabitating persons; and (2) grants to the parties of the relationship legal protections,
benefits, or responsibilities granted to the spouses of a marriage.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 6.204(a) (Vernon 2009). The statute then declares that “[a] marriage between persons
of the same sex or a civil union is contrary to the public policy of this state and is void
in this state” and that
[t]he state or an agency or political subdivision of the state may not give effect
to a: (1) public act, record, or judicial proceeding that creates, recognizes, or
validates a marriage between persons of the same sex or a civil union in this
state or in any other jurisdiction; or (2) right or claim to any legal protection,
benefit, or responsibility asserted as a result of a marriage between persons
of the same sex or a civil union in this state or in any other jurisdiction.
§ 6.204(b)-(c).
33. Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
34. No. 2070086, 2008 WL 2154098 (Ala. Civ. App. May 23, 2008), cert. granted, No.
1080440 (Ala. Mar. 11, 2009).
35. Id. at *1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. N.B. had previously adopted a daughter, who was seven years old at the time
N.B. began her relationship with A.K. A.K. made no claim to parentage over N.B.’s older
daughter. Petitioner’s Brief: Oral Argument Requested at 1, A.K., 2008 WL 2154098
(Ala. filed Apr. 14, 2009) (No. 1080440) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
40. A.K., 2008 WL 2154098, at *1. The child has not seen A.K. since that time.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 39, at 1.
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to a woman in a same-sex relationship with the child’s biological
parent,41 A.K. “filed in the California court a ‘Petition to Establish
Parental Relationship’ in which she described herself as a ‘presumed
mother’ of the child under” California’s Uniform Parentage Act.42
In particular, consistent with the California Supreme Court’s
August 2005 decision, A.K. alleged that she was a presumed mother
under section 7611(d) of the California Family Code because she
received the child into her shared home with N.B. and openly held
the child out as her natural child.43 After a contested hearing in
August 2006, on September 11, 2006, a California trial court declared
A.K. and N.B. both to be parents to the child.44 Five days earlier,
however, N.B. had filed a “Petition for Temporary Custody” in the
Alabama court, in which she sought sole custody of her daughter.45
On November 16, 2006, the Alabama trial court entered a judgment
finding that N.B. was the child’s sole parent.46
After a hearing in December 2006, “the California court ordered
that the child’s birth certificate be amended to reflect A.K.’s status
as a parent of the child.” 47 On February 1, 2007, the California court
issued an order granting limited visitation between A.K. and the
child.48 Two months later in the Alabama court, A.K. appeared for the
first time and filed a “Motion to Dismiss” the Alabama proceeding.49
She contended that under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA), only California could properly exercise jurisdiction over
visitation and custody issues.50 Specifically, she argued that the PKPA
granted continuing exclusive jurisdiction over custody and visitation
matters to California because it first took jurisdiction over the matter,
even though Alabama had issued the first visitation determination.51
The Alabama trial court held that “the proceedings in the California
court were not ‘consistent with’ the PKPA and that it was not required, under the UCCJEA [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act], to defer to the California court.” 52
41. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d
673, 680-81 (Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005).
42. A.K., 2008 WL 2154098, at *1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *2.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *3.
48. A.K. v. N.B., No. 2070086, 2008 WL 2154098, at *3 (Ala. Civ. App. May 23, 2008),
cert. granted, No. 1080440 (Ala. Mar. 11, 2009).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. See infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
PKPA’s statutory structure.
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On May 23, 2008, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed
the trial court.53 The court held “that the PKPA preempted the
Alabama court’s jurisdiction to enter a judgment touching and concerning A.K.’s visitation rights with respect to the child.” 54 It explained that A.K. filed her petition in California before Alabama could
have acquired home state jurisdiction;55 “therefore, as a matter of
federal law, the Alabama court could not properly determine visitation
rights as to the child.” 56
The current Alabama litigation presents the question of whether
Alabama is deprived of jurisdiction pursuant to the PKPA because
California was the child’s “home state” at the time A.K. commenced
the California proceeding.57 Eventually, the ultimate question between
the parties will be whether Alabama must register and enforce a visitation order arising out of a same-sex union from California when the
Alabama Constitution states that “[a] union replicating marriage of
or between persons of the same sex . . . shall be considered and treated
in all respects as having no legal force or effect in this state.” 58
C. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins59
Lisa Miller met Janet Jenkins in 1997 while both women were
living in Virginia.60 In March or April 1998, Miller moved in with
53. A.K., 2008 WL 2154098, at *5.
54. Id.
55. Id. Home state jurisdiction is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4), (c)(2)(A) (2006);
see infra note 109 (quoting definition from the United States Code).
56. A.K., 2008 WL 2154098, at *4.
57. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 39, at 6.
58. ALA. CONST. amend. 774; see also ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2009) (prohibiting samesex marriage).
59. The Miller-Jenkins case is actually four separate but related cases. The first,
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951, addressed a claim
initiated by Lisa Miller in a Vermont family court in December 2003 which sought dissolution of her civil union to Janet Jenkins and resulted in a temporary custody order for
then two-year-old Isabella, Miller’s biological child. This case laid the foundation for the
ongoing interstate custody battle. The second, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637
S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006), addressed in a Virginia circuit court Miller’s request in
July 2004 asking Virginia to decide parentage for Isabella and declare Miller Isabella’s
sole parent under Virginia’s assisted conception statute. The third, Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, No. 0688-06-04, 2007 WL 1119817 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007), aff’d on
procedural grounds, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008), addressed Janet Jenkins’s request in a
Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations court in March 2005 asking Virginia to register the June 2004 Vermont temporary custody order. The fourth, Jenkins v. Miller,
Nos. JJ018902-01F, JA013947-02F (Va. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Jan. 14, 2009), handled
Jenkins’s request for Virginia to enforce the final Vermont custody order.
60. See April Witt, About Isabella, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 4, 2007, at 18, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013001316
.html (providing detailed history of the factual and legal issues involved in the case); see
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Jenkins.61 In December 2000, just a few months after Vermont legalized same-sex civil unions, they traveled to Vermont to enter into a
civil union and immediately returned to their home in Virginia.62 In
August 2001, Miller became pregnant in Virginia via artificial insemination with sperm from an anonymous donor.63 In April 2002,
Miller gave birth to Isabella in Virginia.64 Four months later, they all
moved to Vermont.65 But in late August and early September 2003,
when Isabella was seventeen months old, Miller ended her relationship with Jenkins and returned to Virginia with Isabella.66
In November 2003, Miller filed standard court forms in Vermont
to dissolve the civil union.67 In response to the complaint, Jenkins
retained counsel and asserted a counterclaim seeking an award of
physical and legal custody in her favor, with an award of visitation to
Miller.68 The answer and counterclaim did not contain any allegation
that Miller was an unfit parent but simply alleged that Jenkins was
a parent and desired for custody to be awarded to her.69
Without deciding whether Jenkins was a parent to Isabella, on
June 17, 2004, over Miller’s objections, the court issued a temporary
order (the “Temporary Custody Order”) awarding Miller “legal and
physical responsibility” over Isabella and granted Jenkins parent-child
contact.70 The order directed Miller to give Jenkins unsupervised
also Transcript of Videotaped Deposition of Lisa Miller-Jenkins at 7-8, Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Rutland Fam. Ct. Mar. 26, 2007) (preparing for
Vermont trial).
61. Witt, supra note 60, at 18.
62. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 3, 180 Vt. at 445, 912 A.2d at 956.
63. Witt, supra note 60, at 14.
64. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 3, 180 Vt. at 445, 912 A.2d at 956.
65. Id.
66. Id. Jenkins drove Miller and Isabella back to Virginia, where Miller became a
Christian. Witt, supra note 60, at 20-21.
67. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 3, 180 Vt. at 445, 912 A.2d at 956. At the time, because
Virginia did not legally sanction same-sex relationships, Vermont was the only state in
which Miller could file to dissolve the civil union. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802
A.2d 170, 174-75, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (affirming the trial court’s decision that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve Vermont same-sex civil union); Lane v.
Albanese, No. FA044002128S, 2005 WL 896129, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2005)
(holding that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve Massachusetts samesex marriage).
68. Witt, supra note 60, at 28 (“In early 2004, seven weeks after [Miller] asked the
court to dissolve their union, [Jenkins] filed a counterclaim seeking custody of Isabella
for herself and visitation for [Miller].”).
69. See Answer to Civil Union Dissolution Complaint and Counterclaim, Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Rutland Fam. Ct. Jan. 16, 2004) (asking the court
to award Jenkins “legal rights and responsibilities” and “physical rights and responsibilities for the minor [child]” while only granting Miller “suitable parent/child contact”).
70. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 4, 180 Vt. at 445-46, 912 A.2d at 956. Prior to the
court’s first hearing concerning a temporary order for parental rights and responsibilities,
Miller’s first attorney objected to the court treating Jenkins as a second parent to
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visitation with then two-year-old Isabella two weekends in June, one
weekend in July, and then one week each month of unsupervised
visitation in Vermont beginning in August 2004.71
Two weeks later, on July 1, 2004,72 Miller asked a Virginia circuit
court to decide parentage of Isabella.73 Miller asked the court to declare her Isabella’s sole parent pursuant to Virginia’s assisted conception statute.74 The assisted conception statute provides that “[t]he
gestational mother of a child is the child’s mother.” 75
Jenkins challenged the Virginia court’s subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the parentage action, arguing that the UCCJEA
Isabella. For the first day of hearings on March 15, 2004, Miller obtained new counsel,
Deborah Lashman, to represent her. Witt, supra note 60, at 28 (explaining that “[Miller]
worked her way through” the phone book to find a new attorney). Miller met Lashman for
the first time at the courthouse, approximately thirty minutes before the hearing began.
Id.; Transcript of Continuation of Request for Temporary Order Hearing at 40-41, MillerJenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Rutland Fam. Ct. May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Transcript of Continuation]. Without consultation with Miller, Lashman purported
to waive Miller’s right to challenge the court’s treatment of Jenkins as a parent. Lashman
testified that she had a different interpretation than Miller’s previous attorney concerning
the parental rights of former partners and, without discussing the waiver issue with Miller,
purported to waive Miller’s parental rights in court. During a break in the hearing, Miller
asked Lashman to clarify the courtroom discussion concerning the waiver, but Lashman
explained that she would not discuss the issue with her at that time. Transcript of
Continuation, supra, at 41-45. After the hearing, Miller demanded that Lashman take
steps to revoke the purported waiver. Lashman refused and withdrew from the case. Witt,
supra note 60, at 28-29. Later in the case, Miller learned that Lashman was an anonymous
plaintiff in the landmark Vermont case legalizing second parent adoption for same-sex
couples. Id. at 28; see also In re B.L.V.B. v. E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (explaining
Vermont’s decision to legalize second parent adoption for same-sex partners, the case in
which Lashman was the anonymous plaintiff). Despite the efforts of Miller’s third attorney,
Ms. Barone, to revoke the waiver at the next day of hearings, the court refused to address
the waiver issue. Witt, supra note 60, at 29-30; see also Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 62,
180 Vt. at 468-69, 912 A.2d at 972 (acknowledging Miller’s attempt to revoke the waiver).
71. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 4, 180 Vt. at 445-46, 912 A.2d at 956.
72. On that day, Virginia’s Marriage Affirmation Act became effective. It declares samesex relationships, and any rights arising from a same-sex relationship, void in all respects
in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 to .3 (2008) (prohibiting same-sex marriage and civil
unions or other same-sex relationships purporting to legally approximate marriage).
73. Petition to Establish Parentage and for Declaratory Relief at 2, Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Petition to Establish
Parentage]. It was not until November 2004 that the Vermont trial court issued a parentage determination. In that order, the court acknowledged that the question of how to determine parentage of a child born by assisted reproductive technology had not been addressed
by either the Vermont legislature or any prior Vermont court opinion. The court then
adopted the reasoning of other states to create a new parentage test for Vermont and
applied it retroactively to determine parentage of Isabella, who was born two and one-half
years earlier. Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Waiver to Challenge Presumption
of Parentage at 9-14, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 451-11-03 (Rutland Fam. Ct.
Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Vermont Parentage Order]. For more about the Vermont
Parentage Order, see infra note 79.
74. Petition to Establish Parentage, supra note 73, at 1-2.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(1) (2008).
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prevented Virginia from exercising jurisdiction over the petition.76
She argued that because Vermont had issued the Temporary Custody
Order, the Vermont court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
questions of custody concerning Isabella.77 Despite Jenkins’s objections, on October 15, 2004, the Virginia circuit court issued an order
(the “Virginia Parentage Order”) declaring Miller to be Isabella’s sole
parent.78 One month later, the Vermont trial court issued a ruling (the
“Vermont Parentage Order”) declaring Jenkins a parent to Isabella.79
In March 2005, after the appeals were taken in both Vermont and
Virginia, but before they were argued, Jenkins attempted to register
the Vermont Parentage Order in Virginia.80 By order dated August 8,
2005 (the “Registration Order”), the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
76. Respondent’s Demurrer and Motion for Costs, Fees and Expenses at 4, MillerJenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2004).
77. Id. at 5.
78. Final Order of Parentage, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 2004). The order also declared that “[n]either Respondent [Jenkins] nor
any other person has any claims of parentage or visitation rights over Isabella MillerJenkins.” Id.
79. Vermont Parentage Order, supra note 73. The Vermont Parentage Order was
issued on November 17, 2004, five months after the Vermont court had granted Jenkins
parent-child contact in the Temporary Custody Order. In the Vermont Parentage Order,
the court addressed Miller’s arguments that (1) she be permitted to rebut any presumption
of parentage in favor of Jenkins by submitting evidence that Jenkins had no genetic link
to Isabella, and (2) Lashman’s waiver of Miller’s parental rights was without her consent.
With respect to the paternity presumption, Miller argued that to the extent a husband
or wife is able to rebut a paternity presumption through submission of genetic tests
demonstrating that the husband is not the father, Miller should also be able to rebut any
presumption that Jenkins is a parent to Isabella with genetic proof that Jenkins is not
biologically related to Isabella. Id. at 3, 6, 9; see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308 (2009)
(presumption of parentage statute). Although the court applied the paternity presumption
to the case, it refused to apply the genetic exception. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
2006 VT 78, ¶¶ 53-55, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951. The court analyzed the parentage
question by first explaining that Vermont had not previously “been presented with the
question of parental status concerning a child born during a marriage and conceived
through artificial insemination.” Vermont Parentage Order, supra note 73, at 10. After
briefly discussing a case from New York and one from California, the court “adopt[ed]
the reasoning of other courts” and created a new test for Vermont. Id. at 11 (citing People
v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430
(N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1973)). The test provides that “where a legally connected couple utilizes
artificial insemination to have a family, parental rights and obligations are determined
by facts showing intent to bring a child into the world and raise the child as one’s own
as part of a family unit, not by biology.” Vermont Parentage Order, supra note 73, at 11.
The court then retroactively applied this new test to determine parentage of Isabella. Id.
at 12. Pursuant to the new test, the court declared Jenkins to be Isabella’s second mother
because Jenkins and Miller were in a civil union relationship and intended to create a
family unit when Miller and Jenkins planned for Miller to have a child. Id. at 11; see also
Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 56, 180 Vt. at 465, 912 A.2d at 970 (detailing the reasons for
finding Jenkins to be Isabella’s parent).
80. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 2008).
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(J & DR) District Court registered the Vermont Parentage Order.81
On March 1, 2006, however, the Frederick County Circuit Court reversed the Registration Order, finding that the Vermont Parentage
Order not only contravened Virginia public policy prohibiting recognition of same-sex relationships, but also directly conflicted with
Virginia’s express statutory provisions against recognizing same-sex
relationships.82 Jenkins appealed that order to the Court of Appeals.83
On August 4, 2006, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family
court orders, including the Vermont Parentage Order, in Jenkins’s
favor.84
On November 28, 2006, relying heavily on the Vermont Supreme
Court decision, a panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed
the Virginia Parentage Order.85 The Panel concluded that, despite
Virginia’s prohibition against recognizing any rights flowing from
same-sex unions, Virginia was required to give full faith and credit to
the Vermont Parentage Order pursuant to the PKPA and therefore
lacked jurisdiction to hear Miller’s parentage petition.86 The court
specifically rejected Miller’s argument that DOMA created an exception to the full faith and credit obligation for any order, including
81. Order, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. JJ018902-01F (Va. Juv. & Dom. Rel.
Ct. Aug. 8, 2005). On September 7, 2005, the Vermont Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Miller’s appeals. Ann Rostow, Unique Custody Battle Pits Vermont Against
Virginia, SAN FRANCISCO BAY TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.sfbaytimes.com/index
.php?sec=article&article_id=4065. One week later, on September 14, 2005, the Virginia
Court of Appeals heard oral argument on Jenkins’s appeal from the Virginia Parentage
Order. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VIRGINIA,
June 23, 2009, http://www.acluva.org/docket/miller-jenkins.html.
82. Order Declining Registration of Vermont Order at 2-3, Miller-Jenkins v. MillerJenkins, No. CH05-000336-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2006). The court also held that: (i) the
Vermont Parentage Order granting Jenkins parent-child contact conflicted with the
October 2005 Virginia Parentage Order, which declared Miller the sole, biological parent
to Isabella; and (ii) the court held that Vermont lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue
the Vermont Parentage Order because the civil union was void ab initio. Id. at 2; see infra
note 135 (explaining why Miller pressed the argument that the civil union should be
treated as void ab initio).
83. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 0688-06-04, 2007 WL 1119817 (Va. Ct. App.
Apr. 17, 2007).
84. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 2, 180 Vt. at 444-45, 912 A.2d at 955-56. In its decision,
the court affirmed the validity of the civil union, the decision to declare Jenkins a parent
to Isabella, and the trial court’s refusal to give full faith and credit to the Virginia
Parentage Order. Id. ¶¶ 30, 40, 48, 180 Vt. at 454, 458, 461, 912 A.2d at 962, 965, 967.
The court rejected Miller’s argument that the order granting Jenkins parental rights to
Isabella, over Miller’s objections, infringed Miller’s fundamental constitutional rights.
In particular, the court held that because it had declared Jenkins to be a parent, she had
the same constitutional rights as Miller with respect to Isabella’s care and custody. Id.
¶ 59, 180 Vt. at 466-67, 912 A.2d at 971. The Vermont Supreme Court denied a petition
for reargument on November 9, 2006. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 951.
85. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337-38 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
86. Id.
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child custody orders, that arose from same-sex relationships treated
as marriage.87 After stating that it did not need to address the question of whether Virginia’s marriage laws required a different result,
the Panel stated, in dicta, that to the extent Virginia laws required
a different result, they were preempted by the PKPA.88
On April 17, 2007, a panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals
reversed the March 1, 2006 circuit court order that had refused to
register the Vermont Parentage Order, expressly adopting the rationale set forth in the Court of Appeals’ November 28, 2006 decision.89
Although the Virginia Supreme Court did not grant review from the
parentage order, it did grant Miller’s petition in the registration case.
On June 8, 2008, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, on a procedural ground, the Court of Appeals’ decision in the registration case.90
On January 14, 2009, in a separate action, a Virginia J & DR court
ordered the Vermont Parentage Order to be registered and enforced
in Virginia.91 The court specifically stated that (i) the federal PKPA required Virginia to enforce the order, despite its Marriage Amendment
to the contrary, and (ii) “[r]egistration and enforcement of this Order
is not a recognition or condonation of the Vermont same-sex civil
union.” 92 An appeal is now pending in that case.93
The Virginia cases raise several questions concerning the proper
interpretation of the PKPA and DOMA, including: (i) whether a
“valid” order from a sister state must be registered (recognized) when
it violates core domestic relations’ policy of the receiving state; and
(ii) whether a child custody order from a sister state must be enforced
in violation of the receiving state’s statutes and constitution. This
Article addresses those questions. Because the Miller-Jenkins case
is the first case in the nation to result in a reported opinion on these
full faith and credit questions, with the most developed record and
discussion of the issues, Part II will discuss the full faith and credit
issues within the context of that case.
87. Id. at 336-37.
88. Id. at 337.
89. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 0688-06-04, 2007 WL 1119817 (Va. Ct. App.
Apr. 17, 2007).
90. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 827 (Va. 2008). The court did not
reach the merits in the registration case, holding that the opinion in the Virginia parentage
case was law of the case in the separate registration case. Id.
91. Order, Jenkins v. Miller, Nos. JJ018902-01F, JA013947-02F (Va. Juv. & Dom.
Rel. Ct. Jan. 14, 2009).
92. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.
93. Jenkins v. Miller, Nos. JJ018902-01F, JA013947-02F (Va. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct.
Jan. 14, 2009), aff’d, No. CL09000042-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 2009), appeal docketed,
No. 070509-4 (Va. Ct. App.).
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II. HOW A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE PKPA AND DOMA
UNDERMINES STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER CORE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS MATTERS
At the heart of the three cases described above are two questions:
whether a state is required to give full faith and credit to a sister
state’s order when the order at issue offends the receiving state’s
strong public policy (as set forth in state laws and constitutional
amendments) on core matters relating to marriage and family; and,
if so, whether the full faith and credit obligation also requires the
receiving state to enforce the order. Even more to the point, the case
presents the question of whether a state can refuse to recognize or enforce a child custody order arising out of a same-sex relationship even
though the PKPA requires a state to give full faith and credit to child
custody orders.94 The federal statutory and constitutional provisions
relevant to this discussion are: Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S.
Constitution; the Full Faith and Credit Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738) (FFC
Act); PKPA (28 U.S.C. § 1738A); and DOMA (28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
Pursuant to Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, “[f]ull
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.” 95 Exercising the authority granted to it in the Constitution,
Congress passed the first Full Faith and Credit Act in 1790.96 The
current version of the FFC Act, enacted in 1948, provides, in relevant part, that:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved
or admitted in other courts within the United States and its
94. Unquestionably, Congress intended for the PKPA to require a state to give full
faith and credit to a child custody order where the order involves a custody determination
between the child’s biological parents, regardless of whether the parents ever married.
Similarly, the PKPA requires full faith and credit to be given to a child custody order
where the order involves a custody determination between a heterosexual, married couple
who adopted a child. Those custody orders that arise out of same-sex relationships,
however, necessarily impact unique state law concerns when the state has passed a law
or constitutional amendment refusing to recognize legal unions other than the traditional
one-man and one-woman marriage. DOMA is explicit Congressional recognition of the
unique state sovereignty issues at play under those circumstances. See, e.g., H.R. REP.
No. 104-664, at 2, 17, 24-25 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 (explaining that
DOMA clarifies the sovereign right of states to determine whether to give full faith and
credit to any rights, including custody rights, arising out of same-sex relationships treated
as marriage).
95. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
96. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (1790).
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Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate
of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof,
so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.97

For more than a century, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that protection of an individual state’s sovereignty
required some limitations on the broad scope of the full faith and
credit obligation. In particular, “the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not require a State to apply another State’s law in violation of
its own legitimate public policy,” 98 “substitute the statutes of other
states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning
which it is competent to legislate,” 99 or adopt enforcement mechanisms of the foreign state.100
Unquestionably, when Congress passed the PKPA in 1980, it
necessarily encroached upon a state’s sovereignty over domestic relations matters as part of Congress’s effort to address the specific
problem of parental kidnapping.101 Prior to the PKPA, many states
refused to afford full faith and credit to child custody orders from
sister states because, by their nature, child custody orders are always
subject to modification and therefore are not final judgments.102 The
PKPA established a national standard that deprived a second state
of jurisdiction over child custody or visitation matters once a sister
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
98. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979).
99. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003) (quoting Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988)).
100. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998); see infra notes 215-250 and
accompanying text for a full discussion of the enforcement exception.
101. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1988).
102. Id. at 180. Interestingly, a 1953 decision by the Supreme Court may have contributed to the national problem of parental kidnapping. In May v. Anderson, the Court
held that Wisconsin lacked jurisdiction to issue a custody order because it lacked personal
jurisdiction over the mother who, until just a few weeks prior to the husband’s Wisconsin
filing for a divorce and custody determination, had lived with her husband and three
children in Wisconsin for more than twelve years. 345 U.S. 528, 530, 534 (1953). At the
time the husband filed, the wife was in Ohio with the children where she had taken them
in December to think about the future of her marriage. By New Year’s Day, she had decided not to return to Wisconsin. The husband immediately filed in Wisconsin. Id. at 530.
If, as the May Court held, Wisconsin lacked jurisdiction over the wife, then arguably no
state had jurisdiction to issue a custody order, because Ohio lacked jurisdiction over the
husband, who was a Wisconsin resident. This jurisdictional loophole might have encouraged some to flee to a jurisdiction perceived to be friendlier to the parent’s circumstances.
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state had properly exercised jurisdiction over a custody or visitation
proceeding.103
The PKPA, which is codified in the section immediately following
the FFC Act, requires the courts in one state to “enforce according
to its terms . . . any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions” set forth in the PKPA.104
Simply, the first state that properly exercises jurisdiction over a
case involving a child custody or visitation determination has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over those matters as long as it (i) does
not decline jurisdiction,105 (ii) continues to have jurisdiction under the
laws of that state,106 and (iii) “remains the residence of the child or
of any contestant.” 107
The PKPA establishes a two-tiered criteria upon which a court
can properly exercise jurisdiction over a custody or visitation matter.
First, the court issuing the order must properly exercise both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the case under the laws
of that state.108 Second, one of the following must be satisfied: (1) the
state in which the custody proceeding is commenced must be the
child’s home state on the date of commencement,109 or must “ha[ve]
been the child’s home State within six months before the date of the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such
State because of his removal or retention” by a person who claims a
right to custody;110 (2) no other state has home state jurisdiction and
it is in the best interest of the child that a court of the state in which
the proceeding was commenced assume jurisdiction because the child
and at least one party claiming custody rights have a “significant
connection with [the] State other than mere physical presence in [the]
State, and there is available in [the] State substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships”;111 (3) regardless of the child’s home state,
103. See Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 1987) (“The PKPA quite simply
preempts conflicting state court methods for ascertaining custody jurisdiction.”); see
infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circumstances that led
Congress to pass the PKPA.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (2006).
105. Id. § 1738A(f)(2).
106. Id. § 1738A(f)(1).
107. Id. § 1738A(d).
108. Id. § 1738A(c)(1).
109. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(i). “Home state” is defined as
the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six
consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the
State in which the child lived from birth with any such persons.
Id. § 1738A(b)(4).
110. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii).
111. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B).
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the child is physically present in the state in which the proceeding
was commenced and “the child has been abandoned, or it is necessary
in an emergency to protect the child because the child, a sibling, or
parent of the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse”;112 (4) no other state has jurisdiction under categories
(1) through (3), or another state with jurisdiction under categories
(1) through (3) has “declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody or visitation of the child, and it is in
the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction”;113
or (5) the court has continuing jurisdiction over the matter because
the court previously properly exercised jurisdiction consistently with
the PKPA.114 Thus, if a court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the case and one of the criteria (1) through (5) is satisfied,
once the court issues a custody or visitation determination, it will,
unless it declines jurisdiction, continue to have exclusive jurisdiction
over future custody or visitation matters as long as the state continues
to be the residence of either the child or any “contestant” for visitation
or custody.115
In the Virginia Parentage Action, for example, Jenkins argued
that Virginia lacked jurisdiction to hear Miller’s claim that Miller be
declared Isabella’s sole parent because Vermont had already exercised
jurisdiction over a child custody matter consistent with the PKPA.116
In particular, Jenkins asserted that Vermont had properly exercised
jurisdiction under Vermont law in issuing the Vermont Parentage
Order, thus satisfying the first criteria.117 She also argued that the
second criteria was satisfied because (i) Vermont had been Isabella’s
home state within the six months prior to November 2003, when
Miller commenced the civil dissolution proceeding, (ii) Isabella was
absent from the state because she was living in Virginia with Miller,
and (iii) a “contestant” for custody, Jenkins, continued to live in
Vermont.118 While that first Virginia litigation raised a novel question
112. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C) (section numerals omitted).
113. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(D) (section numerals omitted).
114. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(E).
115. A “contestant” is defined as “a person, including a parent or grandparent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child.” Id. § 1738A(b)(2).
116. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332-33 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
117. Brief of Appellant at 17, Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (No. 2654-04-4). Miller
argued that Vermont did not properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the custody
dispute and, therefore, Vermont did not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the
PKPA. See infra note 135 (explaining Miller’s argument in more detail).
118. Brief of Appellant, supra note 117, at 16-18. Miller argued that Jenkins was not
a contestant because Jenkins did not have a legal basis in either Vermont or Virginia,
at the time the proceeding was commenced, to claim that she was a parent to Isabella.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 1-2, Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (No. 2654-04-4).
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concerning whether a parentage action constitutes a “custody or
visitation determination,” 119 the complex full faith and credit issues
became central when Jenkins subsequently sought to register, and
then later enforce, the Temporary Custody and Vermont Parentage
Orders.120
In March 2005, Jenkins sought to register in Virginia the Vermont
Parentage Order.121 As in other states, once a foreign custody or visitation order is registered, it is treated for enforcement purposes as
119. Miller argued that Virginia could exercise jurisdiction over the Virginia action because the PKPA only prohibits a second state from exercising jurisdiction over a custody
or visitation determination, not a parentage determination. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d
at 335-36. Specifically, the PKPA requires a state to enforce according to its terms, and
not modify, a valid custody or visitation determination of another state, except under
certain exceptions provided for in the statute. A “custody determination” means “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes
permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications.” § 1738A(b)(3).
A “visitation determination” means “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the visitation of a child and includes permanent and temporary orders and initial
orders and modifications.” § 1738A(b)(9). On its face, therefore, the PKPA does not
prohibit a second state from determining parentage as opposed to custody.
Based on the plain language of the statute, other courts have held that where the
PKPA does not include certain proceedings within the definition of “custody determination”
or “visitation determination,” it indicates a deliberate choice by Congress to omit them
from those actions a second court is precluded from taking. For example, in L.G. v.
People, the court had before it the question of whether Colorado had jurisdiction to enter
orders on a petition in dependency and neglect filed by the State when an effect of the
court’s orders was to alter the father’s visitation rights previously granted by an Oklahoma
court. 890 P.2d 647, 653 (Colo. 1995) (en banc). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the PKPA applied to dependency and neglect
proceedings. The Supreme Court explained that
[t]he definition of “custody determination” provided by the PKPA conspicuously omits any reference to child dependency and neglect proceedings. . . .
[W]e find that Congress’ omission of dependency and neglect proceedings in
the definitional section of the PKPA can only mean that Congress made a
deliberate choice not to include those proceedings within the coverage of the
statute.
Id. at 661; see also Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Avinger, 720 P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. 1986) (refusing to apply PKPA to custody determination made within context of a child dependency
or neglect proceeding); In re Sayeh R., 693 N.E.2d 724, 727 (N.Y. 1997) (“[C]hild protective
proceeding is not a ‘custody determination’ within the meaning of the PKPA or New
York’s UCCJEA.”); Sheila L. v. Ronald P.M., 465 S.E.2d 210, 221 (W. Va. 1995) (“The
parentage action in Ohio was not a ‘custody determination’ as defined by the PKPA.”).
A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals agreed with Jenkins, finding that “any common
understanding of the term ‘parental rights’ includes the right to custody . . . . We therefore reject the contention that [Miller’s] ‘parentage action’ is not a custody or visitation
determination embraced by the PKPA.” Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 336; see also A.K. v.
N.B., No. 2070086, 2008 WL 2154098, at *5 (Ala. Civ. App. May 23, 2008), cert. granted,
No. 1080440 (Ala. Mar. 11, 2009) (following the analysis in Miller, the Alabama Court
of Appeals also held that “the PKPA preempted the Alabama court’s jurisdiction to enter
a judgment touching and concerning A.K.’s visitation rights with respect to the child”).
120. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 2008).
121. Id.
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a valid order in the receiving state.122 Miller opposed the request, arguing, among other things, that registration of the Vermont Parentage
Order was prohibited under Virginia law,123 which statute is expressly
permitted by the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).124
DOMA provides in relevant part that:
No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as
a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . or a right or
claim arising from such relationship.125

Consistent with its authority to decide what effect, if any, to give to
same-sex relationships, the Virginia Marriage Affirmation Act (MAA),
which became effective July 1, 2004, provides that:
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between
persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage is prohibited. Any such civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons
of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in
all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby
shall be void and unenforceable.126

Based on that statute, Miller explained that the Vermont Parentage
Order, which treated Jenkins as a parent to Isabella, was void because the parental rights granted to Jenkins arose out of, and were
dependent upon, their former same-sex civil union.127
Miller explained that the Vermont trial court’s jurisdiction to
render the Vermont Parentage Order arose from the fact that a civil
dissolution petition had been filed.128 Thus, just as a court in a divorce
122. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-146.26 to .27 (2008) (concerning registration and enforcement
of foreign orders).
123. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Registration of Foreign Orders at 5-6,
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. JJ018902-01-00 (Va. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005). Miller also argued that (1) the Vermont Parentage Order conflicted with the
Virginia Parentage Order and thus could not be registered and (2) the Vermont Parentage
Order infringed Miller’s fundamental parental rights. Id.; Brief of Appellant at 38-41,
Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (No. 070933).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); see also supra note 94 for a discussion of the rights of
states to make full faith and credit determinations.
125. § 1738C (emphasis added).
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2008) (effective July 1, 2004) (emphasis added).
127. Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 26-29; cf. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
2006 VT 78, ¶¶56-58, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951 (explaining the significance of the underlying civil union to the Vermont court’s parentage determination).
128. Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 12-13; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665
(2009) (stating that a court has jurisdiction to issue an order concerning parental rights

50

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 16:029

action has subject matter jurisdiction to also determine custody and
visitation, the Vermont family court had jurisdiction to determine custody and visitation over children of a civil union by virtue of the pending civil union dissolution proceeding.129 In Vermont, pursuant to the
civil union statute, the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to make
custody determinations in a civil union dissolution action was identical to that in a divorce action between a husband and a wife.130 Thus,
the custody order was an order arising out of a same-sex relationship,
which in Vermont was treated as marriage.131 Miller also explained
that the new parentage test adopted and applied by the Vermont trial
court in its November 2004 order was dependent upon, and inextricably tied to, the underlying same-sex civil union.132
In particular, the test created by the trial court to determine
parentage of a child born by assisted reproductive technology contained two elements: (1) Jenkins and Miller were a legally connected
couple; and (2) Jenkins and Miller intended to bring a child into the
world and raise the child as their own as part of a family unit.133 The
court ruled that “where a legally connected couple utilizes artificial
insemination to have a family, parental rights and obligations are
determined by facts showing intent to bring a child into the world
and raise the child as one’s own as part of a family unit, not by biology.” 134 Because both the jurisdictional basis for the court’s custody
order (arising out of a dissolution action) and the test adopted to determine parentage of a child born by assisted reproductive technology (requiring the couple to be legally connected) were dependent
upon the underlying same-sex civil union, Miller maintained that any
order flowing out of the dissolution proceeding was an order arising
out of the civil union.135 Thus, she argued that the MAA required
and responsibilities when it has jurisdiction to hear the underlying divorce or civil union
dissolution proceeding).
129. Id. §§ 665, 1206.
130. Id. §§ 1204, 1206.
131. Id. § 1204(a) (“Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections
and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court
rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a
marriage.”).
132. Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 13.
133. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 56, 180 Vt. at 465, 912 A.2d at 970. On appeal, the
Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order, explaining that
[m]any factors are present here that support a conclusion that [Jenkins] is
a parent, including, first and foremost, that [Jenkins] and [Miller] were in
a valid legal union at the time of the child’s birth. . . . [T]he couple’s legal
union at the time of the child’s birth is extremely persuasive evidence of joint
parentage.
Id. (emphasis added).
134. Vermont Parentage Order, supra note 73, at 11 (emphasis added).
135. Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 12-13 & n.10. Miller separately argued
before the Vermont Supreme Court and before the Virginia courts that the Vermont trial
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Virginia to treat the Vermont Parentage Order as void in all respects
in Virginia.136
Jenkins responded by arguing that DOMA did not exempt states
from their obligation under the PKPA to give full faith and credit to
child custody orders, but that even if it did, DOMA only concerned
whether one state had to recognize another state’s same-sex marriage,
not whether it could refuse to recognize a custody order arising out
of that relationship.137 She explained that the PKPA’s specific language requiring full faith and credit to be given to child custody orders
trumped the later-enacted DOMA, which generally exempted states
from the obligation to give effect to rights or claims arising from a
same-sex relationship treated as marriage.138 In addition, she explained that when a state fulfilled its obligation to give full faith and
credit it did not give effect to the underlying same-sex relationship
but simply recognized that a custody order had been issued by a state
of proper jurisdiction.139 She separately argued that DOMA was inapplicable because it did not apply to Vermont civil unions, which
were not “treated as a marriage” under Vermont law.140
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve the civil union and therefore any order
issued by that court, in that action, was void. Specifically, Miller explained that Vermont’s
marriage evasion statute declares void any marriage entered into in Vermont by out of
state residents when the marriage is prohibited by the couple’s home state. Id. at 38-41.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6 (2009) (repealed 2009) (“A marriage shall not be contracted
in this state by a person residing and intending to continue to reside in another state or
jurisdiction, if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other state or jurisdiction.”). Miller argued that insofar as the Vermont civil union law requires civil union
couples to be treated the same as married couples, the marriage evasion statute should
apply to declare void a civil union entered into by out of state residents when the couple’s
home state prohibits legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Brief of Appellant, supra
note 123, at 40. The Vermont Supreme Court rejected her argument. Miller-Jenkins, 2006
VT ¶¶ 35-40, 180 Vt. at 455-58, 912 A.2d at 963-65.
136. Brief of Appellant, supra note 123, at 12 & n.9. Even if Virginia declared the
order void in Virginia, it would remain a valid Vermont order, fully enforceable in that
state and any other state without marriage laws declaring such orders unenforceable.
See, e.g., Austin v. Austin, No. CL07-607, slip op. at 6 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2008)
(dismissing petition to dissolve Vermont civil union, holding that “[w]ithin the boundaries
of Virginia, the purported civil union . . . is void”).
137. Brief of Appellee at 21, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va.
2008) (No. 070933). DOMA expressly addresses more than same-sex marriage. The
statutory language expressly recognizes a state’s right to refuse to give full faith and
credit to same-sex relationships treated as marriage. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
138. Brief of Appellee, supra note 137, at 21-22.
139. Id. at 30.
140. Id. at 25-28 (arguing that because the Vermont “legislature created a separate
and largely ‘parallel’ ” structure for civil unions, they were not treated as marriage). But
see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2009) (“Parties to a civil union shall have all the same
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute,
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are
granted to spouses in a marriage.”).
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By order dated August 8, 2005, the J & DR court registered the
Vermont Parentage Order.141 The court concluded that registration
of the Vermont Parentage Order was not barred by the MAA because
“registration of this Order is not a recognition or condonation of the
Vermont same-sex civil union; it is only a recognition that a Vermont
court with jurisdiction over the contestants and the child made a
custody determination.” 142
On March 1, 2006, the circuit court reversed the J & DR’s registration order, holding that “[t]he Vermont Order cannot be registered in Virginia because it contravenes the public policy and direct
statutory law of Virginia.” 143 On April 17, 2007, the Virginia Court
of Appeals, relying entirely on its November 2006 decision in the
Parentage case,144 directed the circuit court to register the Vermont
order in Virginia.145
In the latest stage of litigation, on November 25, 2008, Jenkins
asked a Virginia J & DR court to register and enforce a November 7,
2008 Vermont custody determination, which grants substantial, unsupervised visitation to Jenkins.146 By order dated January 14, 2009,
that court registered and enforced the Vermont order.147 The court
specifically found that “[n]either registration nor enforcement of this
order is barred by the Marriage Affirmation Act or the Marriage
Amendment. The PKPA pre-empts state law and requires [full faith
141. Order, supra note 81.
142. Id. ¶ 5. The court also held that (i) insofar as all the necessary paperwork was
filed, the request for registration comports procedurally with Virginia law; (ii) because
the circuit court, which had entered the Virginia Parentage Order, had exclusive jurisdiction over custody and visitation matters, the J & DR could register the order but
lacked “jurisdiction to entertain any enforcement proceeding arising out of the Vermont
order”; and (iii) an order registering the Vermont Parentage Order was not in conflict with
the Virginia Parentage Order because the circuit court, which had entered the Virginia
Parentage Order, had no original jurisdiction to address the question of registration.
Id. ¶¶ 1-5.
143. Order Declining Registration of Vermont Order, supra note 82, at 2-3.
144. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (explaining the November 2006
order in the Parentage case).
145. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 0688-06-4, 2007 WL 1119817 (Va. Ct. App.
Apr. 17, 2007). The Virginia Court of Appeals adopted the language of the first opinion
for its opinion in the registration case even though (i) the first Virginia Court of Appeals
decision was issued before passage of the Marriage Amendment, (ii) the first decision
expressly stated that the MAA was irrelevant to the question then before the court, and
(iii) the effect and scope of MAA and amendment lie at the heart of the registration case.
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332, 337 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). In other
words, the April 2007 decision did not address the only question that was before it —
whether Virginia was required to give full faith and credit to the Vermont Parentage
Order when DOMA and the MAA prohibited it.
146. Order, supra note 91.
147. Id.
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and credit be given] to Vermont’s custody determination.” 148 Repeating its holding from three years earlier, the Order also states that:
[r]egistration and enforcement of this Order is not a recognition
or condonation of the Vermont same-sex civil union; it is only a
recognition that a Vermont court with jurisdiction over the contestants and the child made a custody or visitation determination.
It does not matter to us what the relationship of the parties, or
the reasons why the Vermont judge made his decision.149

III. PRESERVING STATE SOVEREIGNTY: A PROPER INTERPRETATION
OF THE FFC ACT, PKPA, AND DOMA
Although the proper interpretation of the interplay among the
FFC Act, PKPA, and DOMA is a pure “legal question,” the significance
of the underlying political and emotional issues cannot be ignored.
The dispute over the scope of the three statutes is a dispute about
federalism,150 state sovereignty,151 separation of powers,152 and family
values.153 This author posits that, but for these underlying issues,
148. Id. ¶ 4 (citations omitted).
149. Id. ¶ 5. The circuit court affirmed the Order on March 16, 2009, and the matter
is currently pending before the Virginia Court of Appeals. Jenkins v. Miller, Nos. JJ01890201F, JA013947-02F (Va. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Jan. 14, 2009), aff’d, No. CL09000042-00
(Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 2009), appeal docketed, No. 070509-4 (Va. Ct. App.).
150. Federalism is a structural device established by the Founders to restrain tyranny
by preventing a concentration of power in the central government. For a discussion of the
Founders, federalism, and family law, see Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the
Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 224-27 (2005) [hereinafter
Wardle, Tyranny].
151. Under our dual sovereignty form of federalism, the Constitution expressly grants
the national government ultimate authority over specific matters, with all remaining
authority retained by the states. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution reflects that
any power not expressly granted to the national government remains a matter falling
within the sovereignty of the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Family law matters are one
of those areas that are uniquely of state law concern. Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 150,
at 227.
152. As the cases discussed in this Article reflect, the legal issue of how to properly
interpret the PKPA and DOMA has thus far involved underlying custody orders issued
by state court decisions redefining parentage, which new “laws” were then retroactively
applied to determine parentage of a child born years earlier. For example, in 2004, the
Vermont courts created a new rule to determine parentage of a child born in 2002. For
the discussion of the retroactive application of the parentage determination, see supra
notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
153. An interpretation of DOMA, which expressly permits states to refuse to recognize
orders arising out of same-sex relationships treated as marriage, inevitably invokes the
national debate over what is marriage and how to define family. See Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[C]ourts
in constitutional determinations face issues that are inescapably ‘political’ . . . in that they
involve a choice among competing values or desires.”); see also S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265
S.W.3d 804, 835-36 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (chastising lower court for granting petition for
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there would be little dispute about how to apply them. A historical
review of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the PKPA, and DOMA,
reveal that each state has the sovereign right to refuse to recognize
child custody orders from other states that arise from same-sex
relationships.
A. History of the PKPA and DOMA
Prior to 1980, some courts refused to give full faith and credit
to child custody orders because they were, by their nature, subject
to modification, and therefore non-final.154 Other courts seized on the
language in the FFC Act, which required states to treat custody orders
in the same manner as the issuing state, to exercise jurisdiction over
the custody matter and then modify the sister state’s prior order.155
In an effort to avoid the result of a custody order, parents would kidnap their children, move to a “friendlier” state, and begin custody
litigation anew.156 In response to a national problem of states refusing
to treat custody orders as final orders for full faith and credit purposes, the PKPA sought to clarify that child custody orders should
be given the same status as final judgments for purposes of the full
faith and credit obligation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1738.157 When it
passed the PKPA, Congress hoped to significantly decrease the incidence of parental kidnapping by requiring states to treat child
custody orders the same as final judgments for full faith and credit
purposes.158 While the PKPA requires states to treat child custody
same-sex adoption in clear contravention of Kentucky law in order to achieve a desired
political result); Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 645 (Mass. 2006)
(addressing, with respect to non-resident same-sex couples, the constitutionality of a state
law prohibiting out of state couples from marrying in Massachusetts in contravention
of a couple’s home-state’s laws); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a lawprofession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which
I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct. I noted in an
earlier opinion the fact that the American Association of Law Schools (to which any reputable law school must seek to belong) excludes from membership any school that refuses
to ban from its job-interview facilities a law firm (no matter how small) that does not wish
to hire as a prospective partner a person who openly engages in homosexual conduct.”).
154. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“[S]ome courts doubted
whether custody orders were sufficiently ‘final’ to trigger full faith and credit
requirements.”).
155. See id. at 180 (explaining courts’ entitlement to act in this manner).
156. Id. at 180-81 (“At the time the PKPA was enacted, sponsors of the Act estimated
that between 25,000 and 100,000 children were kidnaped [sic] by parents who had been
unable to obtain custody in a legal forum.”).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 183 (“Congress’ chief aim in enacting the PKPA was to extend the
requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody determinations.”).
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orders as final judgments for purposes of full faith and credit, the
PKPA did not expressly exempt child custody orders from application
of any relevant exceptions to the full faith and credit obligation.159
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the fact
that the PKPA is an addendum to the FFC Act is itself “strong proof”
Congress intended child custody orders to have the “same operative
effect” as other acts, records, and judicial proceedings that fall within
the mandate of the FFC Act:160
[I]t seems highly unlikely Congress would follow the pattern of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and section 1738 by structuring
section 1738A as a command to state courts to give full faith and
credit to the child custody decrees of other states, and yet, without
comment, depart from the enforcement practice followed under
the Clause and section 1738.161

That “enforcement practice” of the full faith and credit obligation
would include application of any then-existing or later-enacted
exceptions thereto.162 DOMA is an express exception to the full faith
and credit obligation for rights arising from same-sex relationships
treated as marriage.163
Invoking its authority under Article IV, Section I of the U.S.
Constitution to prescribe “what (if any) effect” states must give to
“any public act, record, or judicial proceeding . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as marriage
under the laws of such other State . . . or a right or claim arising
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006) (including no express language exempting child custody
orders from application of exceptions to full faith and credit); see also Brief of Appellant,
supra note 123, at n.7 (utilizing this argument in Miller’s brief to the Virginia Supreme
Court).
160. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added).
161. Id. Representative Moss, the sponsor of the PKPA in the House, indicated that
the PKPA “simply would require that the initial State’s custody decree be granted full
faith and credit by subsequent States . . .” 124 CONG. REC. 5727 (1978). Senator Wallop,
the sponsor of the Senate version, intended that the PKPA “would require that full faith
and credit be given to custody determinations which are made in compliance with the
standards set forth in the succeeding subsections.” 124 CONG. REC. 786 (1978).
162. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (acknowledging limitations on the
applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709
& n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (stating general rule that courts will give full faith and credit
to marriage validly contracted in the place where it is celebrated, unless it violates
strong public policy); 129 Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 11 (2000), 2000 WL 33310632, at *7 (“[T]he
Full Faith and Credit Clause would not require the State of Alabama . . . to recognize any
form of homosexual ‘marriage’ that might be conducted in the future under the laws of the
State of Vermont, whether that relationship were legally styled a ‘marriage,’ a ‘civil union,’
or a ‘domestic partnership.’ ”).
163. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 6-10 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2910-14.
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from such relationship,” Congress passed DOMA.164 It did so in 1996
because the nation faced important questions about federalism, state
sovereignty, and the impact of the full faith and credit obligation as
Hawaii considered whether to legalize same-sex “marriage.” 165 DOMA
reserves for each state the authority to determine for itself what legal
effect to give to: (a) same-sex relationships treated as marriage, but
not necessarily called marriage; and (b) rights or legal claims arising
from same-sex relationships treated as marriage.166
At the time of its passage, there was little dispute that DOMA
was express federal recognition that “[d]omestic relations are preeminently matters of state law.” 167 A House Report from the Judiciary
Committee reveals that DOMA was to remove any doubt about a
state’s power to refuse to give full faith and credit to a sister state’s
order that would undermine the receiving state’s power to define
marriage and family for itself.168 The Report explains that:
[W]e simply cannot know exactly how courts will rule on the Full
Faith and Credit Clause issue. As a result, we are confronted now
with significant legal uncertainty concerning this matter of great
importance to the various States. While the Committee does not
believe that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, properly interpreted
and applied, would require sister States to give legal effect to samesex “marriages” celebrated in other States, there is sufficient
uncertainty that we believe congressional action is appropriate.
The Committee therefore believes that this situation presents
an appropriate occasion for invoking our congressional authority
under the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
to enact legislation prescribing what (if any) effect shall be given
by the States to the public acts, records, or proceedings of other
States relating to homosexual “marriage.” 169
164. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 25 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2929.
165. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 7 & n.21 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2911 (discussing questions of whether a Hawaiian same-sex marriage would need
to be recognized by other states).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (“No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage.”).
167. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Mansell
v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989)); see also infra notes 164-87 and accompanying text
(discussing state sovereignty over domestic relations matters).
168. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 25-26 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2929-30.
169. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 25, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2929; see
Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 150, at 223 (explaining that federalism leaves each state
to regulate matters concerning family and marriage); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at
10, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2925 (“[N]ot content to rely on the amorphous
‘public policy’ exception” in order to protect a state’s right to decline to give full legal effect
to same-sex relationships treated as marriage in another state, Congress enacted DOMA.).
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The Report echoed the sentiments shared by others that DOMA did
not create a new exception, but rather, expressly codified an existing
exception.170 For example, Professor Lawrence Tribe, in a letter he
wrote to senator Edward Kennedy, which was introduced into the
Congressional record, urged Congress not to pass DOMA, explaining
that “in light of the ‘public policy’ exception to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, [it] is probably unnecessary.” 171 That report also reflects that DOMA was designed to reserve for each state the decision
whether to confer a broad range of marital benefits on same-sex
couples that are treated as married in other states:
In the abstract, it is difficult to know precisely what consequences would result if a same-sex couple from, say, Ohio, flew
to Hawaii, got “married,” returned to Ohio, and demanded that
the State or one of its agencies give effect to their Hawaiian
“marriage” license. . . . In general, the Committee believes that
at least two things would occur.
First, the State law regarding marriage would be thrown into
disarray, thereby frustrating the legislative choices made by that
State that support limiting the institution of marriage to malefemale unions. . . . Second, in a more pragmatic sense, homosexual
couples would presumably become eligible to receive a range of
government marital benefits. For example, . . . child custody and
support payments; spousal support; premarital agreements;
name changes; nonsupport actions; post-divorce rights; evidentiary privileges; and others.172

On its face, DOMA confirms a state’s sovereignty to refuse to
173
give any effect to any “right or claim arising from such relationship.”
Examples of a right or claim arising from a same-sex relationship
treated as marriage include, for example, claims for divorce,174
second parent adoption,175 child custody, parentage,176 wrongful
170. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2930.
171. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 28, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2932.
172. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 7 n.21, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2911 n.21
(emphasis added).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
174. Compare Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 172, 184 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve civil union because Connecticut
law did not recognize civil unions) with Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502, 50406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (exercising jurisdiction over petition for divorce and child custody
determination of same-sex couple married in Canada).
175. See Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 572 (Cal. 2003) (finding that California
law allows for second parent adoptions and “[n]othing on the face of the domestic
partnership provisions . . . implies a legislative intent to forbid, repeal, or disapprove
second parent adoption”).
176. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (explaining that the parentage
test created by the Vermont trial court in the Miller-Jenkins case declared the partner
to be a parent if the couple was “legally connected” at the time of conception).

58

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 16:029

death,177 spousal inheritance,178 spousal evidentiary privileges,179
and income tax.180 In interpreting the two federal statutes, therefore, the key legal question becomes whether, on the one hand, the
earlier-enacted PKPA mandates full faith and credit despite the
later-enacted DOMA or, on the other hand, DOMA exempts from
the PKPA’s full faith and credit obligation those child custody orders
arising out of same-sex relationships.
Following DOMA’s enactment, thirty-eight states passed statutes defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman or
declaring what effect, if any, same-sex relationships would have in
their states.181 Three other states had previously enacted statutes
defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman.182 Presently, only five states lack statutory language explicitly defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman,183 and thirty states
177. See Bouley v. Long Beach Mem. Med. Center, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 816 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 2005) (finding statutory support for the standing of a same-sex domestic partner
to sue for wrongful death).
178. See T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 55,
60 (2005) (providing overview of same-sex partners’ ability to receive spousal inheritance).
179. See Greenwald v. H & P 29th St. Assoc., 659 N.Y.S.2d 473, 473 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (declining to apply spousal disclosure privileges to same-sex couple).
180. See Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 264 (N.J. 2005) (stating the New Jersey
Domestic Partnership Act provides for many rights to same-sex couples such as an
exemption on state income tax and the right to claim partner as a dependent).
181. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25-101(C), -112(A) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-107, -11-109, -11-208(a) to (b)
(West 2008); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 308.5 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2104 (West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727a(4) (West 2008) (repealed 2009); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1999); FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1
(West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1, -3 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-201, -209 (2009);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5), 5/213.1 (1999 & Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1
(West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101(a) (2008),
declared unconstitutional by Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 402.020(1)(d), .040 and .045 (West 2009); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 89 (1999 & Supp.
2009), 3520 (1994 & Supp. 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272, :273, :275 (2009); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(5) (1998) (amended 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 551.1,
.272 (2005); MINN. STAT. §§ 517.01, .03(a)(4) (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2)
(2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(d) (2007);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.020(1) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (West
2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A), .01(C)(1)(2) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1102, 1704 (2001);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1, -1-38 (2009); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-113(a) to (b) (West 2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 2009); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45.2, .3 (2008 & Supp. 2009);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010(1), .04.020(1)(c) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2104(c), -603 (2009).
182. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1, :2
(2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2009).
183. Those five states are Massachusetts, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, and
Rhode Island. The remaining forty-five states define marriage as one man and one woman.
In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared the marriage laws unconstitutional. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). Although
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have passed constitutional amendments defining marriage as the
union of one man and one woman.184 The breadth of the statutes and
amendments vary. Some simply define marriage as one man and one
woman,185 others provide that a marriage is the union of a man and
a woman and that any legal status identical or substantially similar
to that of marriage for unmarried individuals is not valid or recognized,186 while still others comprehensively explain that a same-sex
union will not be recognized and is void or unenforceable.187 Virginia
passed both a comprehensive statute and amendment protecting
traditional marriage.
the legislature has not passed any implementing legislation, Massachusetts now permits
same-sex couples to marry. In October 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional the state’s marriage laws defining marriage as the union of one man
and one woman as well as the civil union law. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 482 (Conn. 2008). On April 7, 2009, the Vermont legislature overrode the governor’s
veto of a bill legalizing same-sex marriage. John Dillon, Vermont Legislature Oks Gay
Marriage, NPR, Apr. 7, 2009, http://npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=102851810.
On May 6, 2009, the governor of Maine signed legislation permitting same-sex marriage.
S.P.0384-L.D. 1020, 124th Leg., First Sess. (Me. 2009). On November 3, 2009, Maine voters
repealed the law through voter referendum. Ashley Surdin, Gay Groups Say Loss Won’t
Alter Strategy, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2009, at A9.
184. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1;
ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV, para. I; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; IDAHO CONST.
art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST.
art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28;
OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.D. CONST.
art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29;
VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
185. Those states are Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Washington, and
Wyoming. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2009) (“Marriage is a civil contract
between a male and a female person to which the consent of the parties capable of
contracting is essential.”).
186. Those states are Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (“Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”); OR. CONST.
art. XV, § 5A (“[O]nly a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or
legally recognized as a marriage.”).
187. Those states are Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(4) (West 2005) (“Any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state, country, or other jurisdiction
outside this state that extends the specific benefits of legal marriage to nonmarital relationships between persons of the same sex or different sexes shall be considered and treated
in all respects as having no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by
this state.”); see also Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive
Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L. REV.
221, 221-25 (2004-2005) (discussing and explaining the various types of marriage amendments that existed at the time).
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In 2004, Virginia passed the Marriage Affirmation Act (MAA).
It provides that:
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between
persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage is prohibited. Any such civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement entered into by persons
of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in
all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby
shall be void and unenforceable.188

On November 7, 2006, the Virginia electorate voted to amend the
Commonwealth’s Constitution to provide:
That only a union between one man and one woman may be a
marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its
political subdivisions.
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth
or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union,
partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights,
benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.189

Unlike the language of some statutes or amendments that simply
define marriage as the union of one man and one woman, Virginia’s
laws are comprehensive in their mandate that the Commonwealth
and its political subdivisions cannot recognize or enforce a legal status,
other than a marriage between one man and one woman, “to which
is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of
marriage.” 190 The focus then becomes whether the federal interests
behind the PKPA and the full faith and credit obligation override a
state’s decision to categorically refuse to recognize or enforce child
custody orders arising out of same-sex relationships.
B. Federalism Demands Respect for State Sovereignty over Child
Custody Matters
1. There are No Federal Interests Sufficient to Justify Usurping State Control over a Core Domestic Relations Matter of
Who is a Parent
A proper balance between the full faith and credit obligation
and respect of state sovereignty requires the PKPA to be interpreted
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2008) (emphasis added).
189. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (emphasis added).
190. Id.
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as subject to the full faith and credit exception codified in DOMA as
well as a public policy exception. The U.S. Constitution creates a
federal government of limited, enumerated powers,191 not one of general power, such as the powers retained by the states.192 Whereas
the states may legislate in nearly any area that does not violate the
natural rights of the people,193
the federal government is limited to those few powers it was
expressly granted in the Constitution.
....
Thus, the Framers’ Constitution guards the powers of the people
and their state governments jealously. It gives up to the federal
government precisely those powers the Framers considered necessary to correct the shortcomings of its predecessor confederation
and to effect the limited ends of the federal governments.194

In response to critics of the proposed constitution who were concerned that it conveyed too much power to the federal government,
James Madison explained in Federalist No. 45 that “[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” 195 He clarified that “[t]he powers
191. See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (discussing the limits to
the power of the federal government); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the constitution [sic] is written.”).
192. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Signet Classic ed.,
2003) (“The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”).
193. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38, *41 (“Thus, when the Supreme
Being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain
principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would
cease . . . . This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself,
is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this . . . .”).
Blackstone further explained that the laws and moral code of God, our creator, “is called
the law of nature.” Id. at *39. The Bible explains that God created us male and female, in
His own image, and then declared that “a man will leave his father and mother and be
united to his wife, and they will become one flesh.” Genesis 1:26-27, 2:24. Jesus referred to
these same passages when he spoke of marriage to the Pharisees. Matthew 19:3-5; see also
Ephesians 5:31 (referring to the same passages). The Bible also depicts the responsibilities
of a husband toward his wife in terms of Christ’s commitment, as the bridegroom, to his
Church, the bride. Ephesians 5:25-28; Matthew 9:15. Applying Blackstone’s understanding
of the law, human laws that contradict God’s design of marriage are of no validity.
194. ANDREW M. GROSSMAN, THE HERITAGE FOUND., ENUMERATED POWERS ACT BRINGS
THE CONSTITUTION TO CAPITOL HILL 3, 5 (2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/LegalIssues/upload/lm_29.pdf.
195. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Signet Classic ed., 2003).
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reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity
of the State.” 196 Determining who is a parent lies at the very center
of the state’s authority over the lives and liberties of its people.197
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly proclaimed
that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to
the laws of the United States.” 198 Because domestic relations are
“preeminently matters of state law,” the Court has explained that
when Congress passes general legislation it “rarely intends to displace state authority in this area.” 199 In fact, “[b]efore a state law
governing domestic relations will be overridden, it ‘must do major
damage to clear and substantial federal interests.’ ” 200
A state’s non-recognition or enforcement of child custody orders
arising out of same-sex relationships does not do “major damage to
clear and substantial federal interests.” 201 The national interests
that supported passage of the PKPA in 1980 do not permit Congress
to nationalize a redefinition of who is a parent. Insofar as the first
successful use of assisted reproductive technology in the United
States occurred just two years before Congress passed the PKPA,
and long before the national debate over legal recognition of samesex relationships began,202 the Act was not designed to nationalize
196. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 97 (James Madison) (Signet Classic ed.,
2003) (“[T]he general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making
and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects . . . .”).
197. Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 150, at 226 (“Federalism in family law was intended
to check the emergence of national tyranny over family life.”); see also Franks v. Smith,
717 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[I]ssues of domestic relations are the province of state
courts . . . .”); Schapiro v. Montgomery County Court, No. 95-0986, 1995 WL 348670, at *4
(E.D. Pa. June 8, 1995) (“For over one hundred years, courts have consistently held that
family law cases are of paramount importance to the states in which they are pending.”).
198. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 692 (1992) (quoting In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,
13 (2004) (discussing the state court’s role in domestic issues); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.”).
199. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989).
200. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439
U.S. 572, 581 (1979)) (quotation marks omitted).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Timeline, ART PARENTING
ORGANIZATION, http://www.artparenting.org/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009)
(tracking the evolution of Assisted Reproductive Technology). Assisted reproductive technology refers generally to the various “techniques facilitating human procreation by
means other than normal sexual intercourse.” LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN,
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 275 (2002). The major techniques include in
vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, and surrogacy. Id. at 275-76. “IVF involves the
removal of an egg or eggs from a woman, the donation of sperm from a man, and the
combination of them” outside the uterus. Id. at 276. The fertilized egg is then returned
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a federal parentage standard for same-sex couples. Rather, when it
passed the PKPA, Congress sought to address the widespread problem of a parent fleeing with his child to another state to relitigate custody issues after a first state had issued a custody order with which
he disagreed.203 The PKPA deprives a second state from exercising
jurisdiction when the requirements in the PKPA are satisfied, preventing multi-state litigation by a child’s natural or adoptive father
and mother over custody.204 Federal interests in preventing parents
from kidnapping their children, however, are not implicated with
respect to child custody disputes between former same-sex couples
where only one of them is the child’s biological parent.205
Although Congress has the constitutional authority to prescribe
that child custody orders generally should be treated as final orders
for purposes of the full faith and credit obligation, there are outer
limits on that authority.206 Supreme Court precedent concerning
Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce recognizes that
Congress’s authority is not unlimited.207 The U.S. Constitution gives
to the woman’s body or donated to someone else. Id. Artificial insemination, on the other
hand, does not require removal of the eggs from the woman’s body. Instead, the semen
is injected into the woman’s body in the hopes that fertilization will occur. Id. at 275.
Surrogacy refers to the situation where a woman carries and gives birth to a child for
another woman. Id. at 276. The surrogate can use either an egg from another woman or
her own egg fertilized by donated sperm. Id. Although artificial insemination had been
successfully performed prior to the 1970s, the use of all forms of assisted reproductive technology dramatically increased after the first successful birth using in vitro fertilization
in 1978. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY — BACKGROUND PAPER, OTA-13P-BA-48
(1988), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1988/8804/8804.PDF (presenting
statistical, technical, economic, ethical, and legal conclusions regarding infertility practices,
including IVF); see also supra note 165 and accompanying text (pointing out that the
national debate over same-sex marriage began in earnest in 1996).
203. See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text (providing more background on
why Congress passed the PKPA).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (2006).
205. This Article does not address the question of whether one state must give full
faith and credit to an adoption decree that either (i) declares a same-sex partner to be
the adoptive parent to the partner’s child or (ii) declares both partners in a same-sex
relationship to be a child’s parents. While this author maintains that a state can refuse
to give full faith and credit to those adoption decrees, that discussion is beyond the scope
of this Article. See Wardle, Critical Analysis, supra note 3, at 568-69 (explaining why
states constitutionally can refuse recognition to same-sex adoptions); cf. Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (declaring unconstitutional Oklahoma
statute prohibiting recognition of same-sex adoptions); Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d
857, 864 (E.D. La. 2008) (directing Louisiana to recognize foreign same-sex adoption
decree); Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing a decision
dismissing Ms. Embry’s petition for visitation or custody because Florida law does not
recognize the second-parent adoption decree from Washington that permitted Ms. Embry
to adopt Ms. Ryan’s biological child).
206. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
207. Id. at 556-57.
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Congress authority to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.” 208 To determine the outer limits of Congress’s authority, the
Court has explained that:
the interstate commerce power “must be considered in the light of
our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government.” 209

The same concern with obliterating the distinction between
what is of national concern (thus necessitating national uniformity)
and what is of local concern must be considered in interpreting the
outer limits of the PKPA.210 Given the Supreme Court’s longstanding
acknowledgment that domestic relations matters are “preeminently
matters of state law,” a nationalized standard of what is marriage and
who is a parent that conforms not to the standard of the overwhelming majority of states but to that of a handful of states obliterates the
distinction between national and local interests without advancing
any clear and substantial federal interest.211 Interpreting the PKPA
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
209. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Nat’l Labor Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S.
1, 37 (1937)); see also Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 365 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)
(“To hold that Congress has general police power would be to hold that it may accomplish
objects not entrusted to the General Government, and to defeat the operation of the Tenth
Amendment . . . .”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed . . . .”). The author takes no
position in this Article as to whether the Supreme Court has properly decided the outer
limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. Cf. KEVIN R. C. GUTZMAN, THE POLITICALLY
INCORRECT GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 99-101 (2007) (discussing how Congress has
exceeded its authority under the guise of its power to regulate interstate commerce).
210. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison) (discussing the limited powers of
the federal government).
211. Congress interferes with a state’s sovereignty over child custody matters when
a custody determination is based on one state’s redefinition of parentage that permits
a legal stranger to be treated as a parent over the objections of the child’s fit parent. Each
state has the right to refuse to recognize that fundamental restructuring of the family.
In contrast, a state’s interest in a joint custody presumption or primary caretaker presumption does not involve the same type of core domestic relations issue, and therefore the
state interest must cede to the federal interests behind the full faith and credit obligation.
Cf. Walker v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Ky. 2004) (“[T]he Full Faith and
Credit Clause was designed to give the United States certain benefits of a unified nation,
but a judgment of sister state need not be recognized by another state if it is an improper
infringement on the interests of the latter state.” (quoting Brengle v. Hurst, 408 S.W.2d
418, 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004))); Wamsley v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 178 P.3d 102, 115 (Mont.
2008) (“A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized
or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the
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as to require full faith and credit to child custody orders with an
exception for orders arising out of same-sex relationships (including
treating a non-parent as a parent) strikes the proper balance.
The issue of whether to nationalize a parentage standard through
the full faith and credit obligation raises unique concerns that are
not implicated to the same degree in the Supreme Court precedent
requiring a state to give full faith and credit to a divorce decree rendered in another state even if the divorce decree violates the public
policy of the receiving state.212 Professor Lynn Wardle, in his article
discussing whether states must give full faith and credit to adoptions
by same-sex couples, explains the substantive distinction between giving full faith and credit to a divorce judgment and an adoption decree:
A divorce judgment . . . terminates an ongoing relationship,
declaring an end to the parties’ spousal relationship. It declares
an end to the family relationship of husband and wife. No further
supervision of the spousal relationship is required. An adoption
decree, on the other hand, creates a new family relationship,
bringing into existence an ongoing relationship, and one which
the state, as parens patriae, has extraordinary interest in monitoring, supervising, and regulating. . . . Together, marriage and
adoption establish the longitude and latitude of nuclear family
relations, from which a host of legal duties, responsibilities, and
privileges derive, such as spousal and child support, and many
noneconomic obligations and rights including testimonial privileges, rights regarding consultation, advise (for spouses), and
training and direction (for children). It is well-established that
marriage recognition is not regulated by strict interstate recognition rules; so it would be logical and reasonable to expect that adoption recognition also would not be governed by strict (judgment)
recognition rules.213
national policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference
with important interests of the sister State.”); Seiller & Handmaker, L.L.P. v. Finnell,
165 S.W.3d 273, 276-77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (“Tennessee courts are not obligated to give
full faith and credit to any judgment of a state which we hold to be violative of Tennessee’s
public policy or the Federal Constitution.” (quoting Aqua Sun Inv., Inc. v. Henson, 1993
WL 382230, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993))). But see Craven v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 117 P.3d 11, 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has ruled
that there is no public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it relates
to judgments of a sister state.”); Clark v. Rockwell, 435 S.E.2d 664, 667 (W. Va. 1993)
(“[L]ater cases appear to hold that the forum state’s public policy cannot override the
enforcement of a valid judgment . . . .”).
212. For the Supreme Court’s discussion regarding the moral and religious dilemmas
posed by reconciling the Full Faith and Credit Clause with divorce decrees issued in one
state but affecting another state’s marriage and divorce laws, see Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
213. Wardle, Critical Analysis, supra note 3, at 590-91 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
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This same argument would apply with equal force to child custody
orders arising from same-sex relationships where a judge has created the legal fiction that a third party is a parent to another person’s
biological child.
Not only must an exception to the PKPA be recognized to protect
the state sovereignty of the majority of states that prohibit recognition of same-sex relationships, but the language of the PKPA itself
does not support the argument that the PKPA imposes an absolute,
national requirement to give full faith and credit to child custody
orders. Nothing in the PKPA’s text or legislative history exempts it
from application of then-existing or yet-to-be enacted exceptions.214
2. The Enforcement Exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Requirement
A separate exception to an interpretation of the PKPA that
establishes a nationalized parentage standard is the enforcement
exception. Thus, even if the PKPA requires a state to give full faith
and credit to a child custody order arising from a same-sex relationship, the obligation to give full faith and credit to a foreign order does
not impose upon a sister state the obligation to enforce any order to
a greater extent than the order would be enforced if rendered by a
court in the state.
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained the scope of the full faith
and credit obligation. Specifically, although pursuant to the full faith
and credit requirement an order “gains nationwide force” for purposes of “claim and issue preclusion (res judicata),” it “does not mean
that States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the
time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement
measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive
effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control
of forum law.” 215 Thus, according to the Court’s decision in Baker,
while a foreign order might be given res judicata effect as to the
214. Whether Congress has the constitutional authority to enact a statute requiring
full faith and credit under any and all circumstances is beyond the scope of this Article.
In light of the discussions contained in this Article, however, the author maintains that
Congress lacks authority to do so.
215. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233, 235 (1998) (emphasis added); see
also Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining, in the
context of asking whether Oklahoma had to recognize an out of state same-sex adoption,
that “[e]nforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive
effects do; such measures remain subject to the even-handed control of forum law. . . .
If Oklahoma had no statute providing for the issuance of supplementary birth certificates for adopted children, the Doels could not invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause
in asking Oklahoma for a new birth certificate.”).
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issues litigated, thereby preventing a second state from relitigating the issues, the order can only be enforced pursuant to the time,
manner, and mechanisms available for enforcement in the receiving
state.216 For example, “[o]rders commanding action or inaction have
been denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported to
accomplish an official act within the exclusive province of that other
State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had
no authority.” 217 Consistent with this exception, the Supreme Court
has long held that a “sister State’s decree concerning land ownership
in another State has been held ineffective to transfer title, although
such a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and obligations running between the parties to the foreign litigation.” 218
In Fall v. Estin,219 the Supreme Court held that a Washington
divorce decree purporting to transfer title to marital property located
in Nebraska need not be recognized in Nebraska under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.220 The Court explained that while the full faith
and credit obligation conclusively determines the merits of the underlying claim of land ownership, the Washington order does not require
Nebraska to transfer title to the property.221 Consistent with that logic,
in his concurring opinion in Baker, Justice Scalia explained that the
“Full Faith and Credit Clause ‘did not make the judgments of other
States domestic judgments to all intents and purposes, but only gave
a general validity, faith, and credit to them, as evidence.’ ” 222
The distinction between enforcement and res judicata effect is a
longstanding one. In 1839, the Supreme Court differentiated between
recognition of foreign judgments as evidence for issue or claim preclusion, which is what Baker says is required under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, and execution of foreign judgments, which is governed by the law of the forum state:223
216. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235, 238.
217. Id. at 235; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 (1971)
(distinguishing between enforcement and res judicata effect for purposes of the full faith
and credit obligation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 cmt. b (1971)
(“[A state can deny full faith and credit] when recognition of a sister State judgment would
require too large a sacrifice by a State of its interests in a matter with which it is primarily
concerned.”); 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4467 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that although a
second state may not need to directly enforce a non-monetary judgment from another
state it would still be required to give the judgment res judicata effect).
218. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (citation omitted).
219. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
220. Id. at 2, 4.
221. Id. at 4, 11.
222. Baker, 522 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
223. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 324-25 (1839).
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[T]he judgment is made a debt of record, not examinable upon
its merits; but it does not carry with it, into another state, the
efficacy of a judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by
execution. . . . [U]nder the first section of the fourth article of the
Constitution, judgments out of the state in which they are rendered, are only evidence in a sister state that the subject matter
of the suit has become a debt of record, which cannot be avoided
but by the plea of nul teil record.224

Thus, while the full faith and credit obligation might require a receiving state to acknowledge a foreign custody determination arising
out of a same-sex relationship as evidence for res judicata purposes,
it can only be executed in the receiving state as that state’s “laws
may permit.” 225
Two recent federal court decisions highlight the distinction.226
In Finstuen, the court addressed the question of whether a state law
that refused to “recognize an adoption by more than one individual of
the same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction” was constitutional.227 Although the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma’s statute
prohibiting recognition of out of state same-sex adoptions violated
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the decision acknowledges Baker’s
enforcement distinction.228 Following the logic of Baker, the Oklahoma
non-recognition statute in Finstuen was constitutionally defective
because it impermissibly created an exception to recognition (res
judicata), rather than refused to enforce an out of state adoption on
the same terms as it would refuse to enforce such an adoption within
the state.229 Since the statute refused to even give res judicata effect
to sister state orders, consistent with Baker, the Finstuen court held
that it was directly contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.230
224. Id. at 325.
225. Baker, 522 U.S. at 242 (quoting Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 187 (1901)); see
also Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386, 394 (1910) (“[The full faith and credit obligation]
does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one State to property situated in another,
but only makes the judgment rendered conclusive on the merits . . . [and then it] can only
be executed in the latter [state] as its laws permit.”); Johnson v. Johnson, 849 N.E.2d 1176,
1179-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that a domesticated foreign judgment, including
the interest award, is entitled to full faith and credit “unless the judgment debtor can show
that the enforcement of the post-judgment interest part of the judgment would violate
Indiana public policy”).
226. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (involving recognition of
out of state same-sex adoption); Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. La. 2008) (same).
227. 496 F.3d at 1141-42 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 1153, 1156.
229. Id. at 1155-56 (“The Doels do not seek to enforce their adoption order . . . . At issue
here is a state statute providing for categorical non-recognition . . . .”).
230. Id.
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As further evidence of the recognition/enforcement distinction,
the Finstuen Court explained that the full faith and credit obligation
is not violated if the state applies its law to deny adoptees the right
to inherit land or attain similar state rights and privileges.231 Citing
the Supreme Court’s explanation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
in Baker, as well as the provision in Restatement(Second) of Conflict
of Laws section 99 that “[t]he local law of the forum determines the
methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced,” the Tenth
Circuit emphasized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
strip states of their ability to enforce their own laws.232 In other words,
if the Oklahoma statute had both prohibited recognition and enforcement, the result would likely have been different.
The Tenth Circuit emphasized the recognition/enforcement distinction when it explained that Oklahoma’s argument that it could
refuse to recognize the same-sex adoption “conflates Oklahoma’s obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister state’s judgment with its
authority to apply its own state laws in deciding what state-specific
rights and responsibilities flow from that judgment.” 233 “If Oklahoma
had no statute providing for the issuance of supplementary birth
certificates for adopted children,” then the plaintiffs could not invoke the Full Faith and Credit Clause to compel Oklahoma to issue
a new birth certificate.234 However, since Oklahoma did have such
a statute, and lacked any state law of even-handed application that
precluded enforcement of same-sex adoptions, it already had the
“necessary mechanism for enforcing” the adoption judgment as requested.235 Therefore, the plaintiffs were merely asking Oklahoma
to apply its own law to their adoption order.236 The Finstuen Court
231. Id. (citing Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 615 (1915)). In Hood, the Supreme
Court upheld the right of Alabama to exclude children adopted by proceedings in other
states from those upon whom property will devolve by descent. In that case, plaintiffs,
who sought a share of their adopted father’s estate, were adopted in Louisiana. The
decedent’s will plainly intended for all his children, including his adopted children, to
share equally in the estate. Alabama, however, refused to treat the adopted children as
heirs for purposes of the property located in Alabama. Hood, 237 U.S. at 614-15.
The Alabama statute of descents . . . excludes children adopted by proceedings
in other States. . . . The construction does not deny the effective operation of
the Louisiana proceedings but simply reads the Alabama statute as saying
that whatever may be the status of the plaintiffs, whatever their relation to
the deceased by virtue of what has been done, the law does not devolve his
estate upon them. There is no failure to give full credit to the adoption of
the plaintiffs, in a provision denying them the right to inherit land in
another State.
Id. at 615.
232. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1153-54.
233. Id. at 1153.
234. Id. at 1154.
235. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
236. Id.
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explained: “Oklahoma continues to exercise authority over the manner in which adoptive relationships should be enforced in Oklahoma
and the rights and obligations in Oklahoma flowing from an adoptive relationship.” 237
A federal district court reached the same result, following the
same Baker logic, in a very similar case.238 In Adar, the court concluded that Louisiana had to recognize an out of state same-sex
adoption even though same-sex adoptions were, by practice but not
statute, prohibited in Louisiana.239 Although Louisiana did not have
a statute expressly stating that it refused to recognize out of state
same-sex adoptions, its recent constitutional amendment expressly
stated that “[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that
of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.” 240 As in Finstuen, the ban only spoke of the state’s refusal to
recognize; it was not a refusal to enforce any same-sex adoption or
rights arising from a same-sex relationship.241 After discussing the
Baker distinction between recognition and enforcement, it concluded
that Louisiana had to recognize the out of state adoption.242
Thus, while the full faith and credit obligation may require registration or recognition for purposes of giving preclusive, res judicata
effect, it “can only be executed in [another State] as its laws may
permit.” 243 Even assuming Baker requires a sister state to register
(give res judicata effect to) a foreign custody order contrary to that
state’s express public policy on a core domestic relations matter,244
the state cannot be required to enforce those orders to any greater
extent than they would be enforced in the receiving state.245
To the extent the PKPA is interpreted as requiring enforcement of a child custody order arising out of a same-sex relationship,
Congress lacks the authority to require enforcement of such an order.
237. Id.
238. Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. La. 2008).
239. Id. at 862.
240. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
241. Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 862-64.
242. Id. at 861-62 (“Defendant . . . confuses the issues of Louisiana’s obligation to give
full faith and credit to a valid out-of-state adoption decree and Louisiana’s right to apply
its own laws in deciding what rights flow from that judgment.” (citing Finstuen, 496 F.3d
at 1153)).
243. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 242 (1998) (quoting Lynde, 181 U.S.
at 187) (quotation marks omitted).
244. To the extent Baker stands for the proposition that a state must give full faith
and credit to an order arising from a same-sex relationship, it unconstitutionally infringes upon a matter reserved to the states. See supra notes 95, 191-200 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and
separation of powers).
245. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235, 242.
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The U.S. Constitution states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.” 246 Consistent with that authority,
Congress enacted the Full Faith and Credit Act, which explains how
a foreign order is authenticated and that, once authenticated, it
“shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State[s].” 247 As discussed, the Supreme Court has explained that full
faith and credit obligation requires a state to give the judgment res
judicata effect but the “time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing
judgments . . . remain subject to the evenhanded control of the forum
law.” 248 Because the Constitution requires states to give full faith
and credit (which means res judicata, but not enforcement), and the
Constitution only grants Congress the authority to provide the manner
in which foreign orders shall be proved for purposes of that full faith
and credit obligation,249 Congress lacks constitutional authority to
mandate enforcement of foreign orders. Thus, whether a child custody
order arising out of a same-sex relationship is enforceable in another
state is determined by the evenhanded application of the receiving
state’s laws. For those states that evenhandedly refuse to enforce
orders arising out of same-sex relationships — whether derived from
an in-state or out-of-state order — those states can refuse to enforce
a foreign custody order arising out of a same-sex relationship.
C. Relevant Canons of Statutory Construction
Interpreting the PKPA as subject to the exception recognized in
DOMA and the enforcement exception is consistent with at least two
canons of statutory construction:
It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words
of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme.” A court must therefore
interpret the statute as a “coherent regulatory scheme . . . .”
....
. . . The “classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted
over time, and getting them to ‘make sense’ in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered
246.
247.
248.
249.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
Baker, 522 U.S. at 233, 235.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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by the implications of a later statute.” This is particularly so
where the scope of the earlier statute is broad but the subsequent statutes more specifically address the topic at hand.250

The legislative history confirms that DOMA, as the later-enacted,
more specific statute, carved child custody orders out from a state’s
general full faith and credit obligation, as codified in the PKPA.251
Prior to the PKPA, child custody orders were not treated as final
orders and, therefore, were not afforded full faith and credit.252 From
1980 until 1996, states were required to give full faith and credit to
custody orders issued consistently with the requirements of the
PKPA.253 In 1996, Congress expressly carved out a subset of all final
orders, including child custody orders treated as final orders pursuant
to the PKPA, for an exception to the full faith and credit obligation.254
DOMA exempts from the full faith and credit obligation any and all
orders arising out of same-sex marriages or same-sex relationships
treated as marriage.255 By definition, some of the orders that fall
within that exception will be child custody orders arising out of samesex relationships and some will be wholly unrelated to child custody
matters. Regardless of the subject of the order, if it arises from a samesex marriage or a same-sex relationship treated as marriage, then
DOMA codifies each state’s sovereign right to refuse to give full faith
and credit to the order.
A second relevant cannon of construction is that courts have a
duty to interpret statutes so as to avoid constitutional deficiencies.256
An interpretation of the PKPA that requires Virginia to give full faith
and credit to an order declaring a third party to be a parent over the
objections of the fit, biological parent, requires Virginia to treat similarly situated same-sex couples differently. A recent Virginia Court
250. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 143 (2000) (citation
omitted).
251. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 336-37 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); see
supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (explaining that the PKPA is subject to thenexisting and later-enacted exceptions to the full faith and credit requirement).
252. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 333-34.
253. Id. at 334, 336.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007) (“[E]very reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”);
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (“First, as a general matter, when a particular
interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear
indication that Congress intended that result. Second, if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative
interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ we are obligated to construe the statute
to avoid such problems.”) (citation omitted).
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of Appeals decision involving a same-sex custody dispute highlights
this issue within Virginia and the dozen or more states that refuse
to grant parental rights to third parties over the objections of the
sole, fit biological parent.257
Christine Stadter and Jennifer Siperko were in a same-sex
relationship from May 1999 until the early summer of 2004.258 On
January 10, 2003, Jennifer gave birth to a child.259 Christine did not
adopt the child, because she could not in Virginia.260 When the relationship between Christine and Jennifer ended, the child was approximately one and a half years old.261 In September 2004, Christine
filed in Virginia a petition for visitation, to which Jennifer objected.262
Christine asked the court to grant visitation based on her “asserted
status as [the] child’s de facto parent.” 263 The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s refusal to grant visitation.264
The court explained that “courts may grant visitation to a nonparent in contravention of a fit parent’s expressed wishes only when
justified by a compelling state interest.” 265 It went on to state that,
[C]ompelling state interests in the child’s health or welfare will
operate to overcome the presumption in favor of a fit biological
parent in certain specific circumstances, including where a parent
“voluntarily relinquishes” custody and care of a child to a nonparent, or where it has been “established by clear and convincing
evidence [that there are] ‘special facts and circumstances . . .
constituting an extraordinary reason for taking a child from its
parent, or parents.’ ” 266

Finding no such special facts and circumstances, the trial court refused to grant Christine visitation.267
In Miller, the court directed Virginia to register as a valid Virginia
order a decision that is directly at odds with the holding in Stadter.268
257. Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); see Lindevaldsen, supra
note 3, at 7-16 (exploring the Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000), which held unconstitutional a Washington statute allowing any person to sue
for visitation over the fit parent’s objection).
258. Stadter, 661 S.E.2d at 496.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 496, 501.
261. Id. at 496, 497.
262. Id. at 496.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 501.
265. Id. at 497.
266. Id. at 498.
267. Id. at 497.
268. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78, ¶ 72, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951
(affirming temporary visitation award to Jenkins despite no finding that Miller was an
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In Miller, the Vermont courts declared Jenkins a parent without
any showing of special facts and circumstances or any consideration
whatsoever of the biological parent’s wishes.269 Thus, in Virginia, two
biological mothers who live less than three hours apart are treated
differently. Both women were in a same-sex relationship for five to
seven years, both mothers ended their relationship when the child
was approximately eighteen months old, and both were Virginia residents at the time the child was born.270 Nevertheless, in one case, the
former partner is not entitled to parentage rights because the Virginia
courts have held that granting such rights would infringe the biological mother’s constitutional rights,271 while in the other case, a former
partner is entitled to parentage rights pursuant to a foreign order
that now must be treated as a valid Virginia order.272 Under these
unfit parent); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337-38 (Va. Ct. App.
2006) (reversing trial court’s decision and instructing that full faith and credit be given
to the Vermont court’s decision).
269. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 59, 180 Vt. at 466-67, 912 A.2d at 971 (“[Jenkins] was
awarded visitation because she is a parent of IMJ. [Miller’s] parental rights are not
exclusive.”).
270. Stadter, 661 S.E.2d at 496; Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332.
271. Stadter, 661 S.E.2d at 498.
272. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 337. The Virginia decision undermines Virginia’s
marriage policies in yet another way. The Virginia Court of Appeals stated that
[t]his case does not place before us the question whether Virginia recognizes
the civil union entered into by the parties in Vermont. Rather, the only
question before us is whether, considering the PKPA, Virginia can deny full
faith and credit to the orders of the Vermont court regarding [Isabella’s]
custody and visitation. It cannot.
Id. The J & DR court reached the same conclusion in its January 14, 2009 order. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text (explaining the J & DR court’s order). In other words,
the court addressed the child custody order in a vacuum, ignoring the fact that Vermont
declared a legal stranger to be Isabella’s parent because Isabella’s biological mother was
in a same-sex civil union with that legal stranger at the time Isabella was born. That
analysis, however, elevates form over substance. The substance of the case before the
Vermont court was the fact that Jenkins’s claim to parentage and custody was inextricably tied to her same-sex civil union with Miller: (i) Jenkins had no claim to parentage
under Vermont law but for her civil union relationship with Miller; and (ii) the court’s
jurisdiction in that case to issue the custody order arose from the pending same-sex civil
union dissolution proceeding. The Vermont opinions clearly explained the significance
of the underlying civil union to the parentage and custody determinations. See MillerJenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 56, 180 Vt. at 465, 912 A.2d at 970 (“Many factors are present here
that support a conclusion that [Jenkins] is a parent, including, first and foremost, that
[Jenkins] and [Miller] were in a valid legal union at the time of the child’s birth.”)
(emphasis added); Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 56, 180 Vt. at 466, 912 A.2d at 971 (“[T]he
couple’s legal union at the time of the child’s birth is extremely persuasive evidence of
joint parentage.”) (emphasis added); Vermont Parentage Order, supra note 73, at 10-11
(adopting a new parentage rule: “where a legally connected couple utilizes artificial insemination to have a family, parental rights and obligations are determined by facts showing intent to bring a child into the world and raise the child as one’s own as part of a family
unit, not by biology.”) (emphasis added). In addition, the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue
the temporary custody order was derivative of its jurisdiction to dissolve the same-sex
civil union. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT ¶ 2, 180 Vt. at 445, 912 A.2d at 956.
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circumstances, the PKPA, as applied, raises equal protection concerns. In addition, as discussed earlier, to require a state to enforce an
order arising from a same-sex relationship in violation of that state’s
public policy, on a matter preeminently of state concern, would render
the PKPA unconstitutional as applied.273
D. Unconstitutional Orders Cannot Be Given Full Faith and
Credit
Another practical reason that the orders in Miller, Charisma R.,
and A.K. cannot be registered or enforced is that they are unconstitutional. Neither the Vermont courts (in Miller) nor the California
courts (in Charisma R. and A.K.) properly considered the fundamental
constitutional rights of a fit parent to direct the upbringing of her
child.274 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the
right of a parent to direct the upbringing of her child is a fundamental
right.275 In Troxel, the Court explained that when a court is deciding
a third party claim for visitation, the constitutional minimum requires that at least “some special weight” be given to the parent’s preference.276 On the face of the orders from the Vermont and California
courts, no special weight was given to the parent’s preference. No constitutional analysis whatsoever was performed prior to declaring a
legal stranger to be a parent.277 On their face, therefore, the orders
are unconstitutional.278
273. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s lack of
authority to require states’ enforcement of child custody orders arising from same-sex
relationships in other states).
274. In Miller, the Vermont Supreme Court dispensed with Lisa’s parental rights
claim in two sentences: “[Jenkins] was awarded visitation because she is a parent of IMJ.
[Miller’s] parental rights are not exclusive.” 2006 VT 78, ¶ 59, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951.
Thus, without any constitutional analysis, the court declared Jenkins a parent and gave
her constitutional rights equivalent to the biological parent.
275. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
276. Id. at 70. Troxel involved a question of what weight, if any, should a parent be
given when a third party (a grandparent in Troxel) seeks visitation. If a parent’s fundamental rights dictate that courts perform a constitutional inquiry before a third party
can be awarded visitation, the constitutional analysis is even more vital to protect the
biological parent’s rights when a court considers treating a third party as a parent. See
Lindevaldsen, supra note 3, at 43-58 (discussing the proper standard to be applied in third
party parentage and visitation cases).
277. See Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding
on statutory grounds); Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT at ¶¶ 45-47, 180 Vt. at 460-61, 912 A.2d at
966-67 (looking solely at the status of the two women based on their domestic partnership).
278. With respect to those cases where a third party asks to be treated as a parent, any
test other than the strict scrutiny analysis to resolve those claims fails to protect a biological or adoptive parent’s fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W.,
845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004) (“The question of by what standard a person is determined
to be a de facto parent implicates both the fundamental liberty interests of natural and
adoptive parents . . . .”); Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ¶ 33, 154 P.3d 808 (“[I]n carving out
a permanent role in the child’s life for a surrogate parent, this court would necessarily
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The full faith and credit obligation cannot logically be interpreted
to require a state to register and enforce an unconstitutional order
from a sister state.279 For example, no one would question a state
court’s decision to refuse to give full faith and credit to a court order
from a sister state that declared a marriage void solely because it involved an interracial couple.280 It is illogical to suggest that a receiving
state, recognizing the unconstitutionality of the sister state’s order,
must give full faith and credit to the order. The Supreme Court has
long held, for example, that “[a] judgment obtained in violation of procedural due process is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued
upon in another jurisdiction.” 281 The Supreme Court, however, has
not yet addressed the question of whether a court order that violates
some other federal constitutional guarantee — other than procedural
due process — must be given full faith and credit. There can be no
federal interest, however, in requiring one state to give full faith and
credit to an order that unconstitutionally infringes an individual’s
substantive rights under the U.S. Constitution.
The decisions in Miller, Charisma R., and A.K. are unconstitutional for at least two reasons. First, as briefly mentioned above, they
unconstitutionally infringe the biological mother’s parental rights insofar as they fail to apply, at a minimum, the Troxel presumption.282
Second, courts have retroactively applied new parentage rules to
declare the former partners to be parents, which infringes the substantive parental rights of the biological parents.283 While the U.S.
subtract from the legal parent’s right to direct the upbringing of her child and expose the
child to inevitable conflict between the surrogate and the natural parents.”). For a detailed
discussion of the rights of fit parents when faced with third party parentage claims, see
Lindevaldsen, supra note 3, at 43-57.
279. See, e.g., Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 57 (Alaska 2008) (refusing to give full faith
and credit to tribal council adoption proceeding because due process was denied in the
proceedings); Weidner v. W.G.N., 371 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to
give full faith and credit to Michigan judgment obtained in violation of equal protection).
280. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating race-based classifications
relating to who could marry whom); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating
state law that prohibited certain real estate transactions in order to maintain racially
segregated neighborhoods).
281. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946) (citation omitted); see also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (“A judgment rendered in violation
of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit
elsewhere.”) (citation omitted); cf. Malissa C. v. Wayne H., 2008-NMCA-128, ¶ 30, 145 N.M.
22, 193 P.3d 569 (“[T]he UCCJEA by its express terms requires a court faced with a childcustody proceeding pending in another state to determine whether the court in the other
state has ‘jurisdiction substantially in conformity’ with the UCCJEA.”) (citation omitted).
282. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78, ¶ 59, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951
(declaring the Troxel argument to be waived because it was not mentioned during trial
and further rejecting the argument because it assumes that Janet is not Isabella’s parent).
283. A.K. v. N.B., No. 2070086, 2008 WL 2154098, at *1 (Ala. Ct. App. May 23, 2008),
cert. granted, No. 1080440 (Ala. Mar. 11, 2009); Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 44 Cal. Rptr.
3d 332, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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Constitution’s ex post facto clause has been interpreted to prohibit
only retroactive application of criminal laws, many states prohibit
retroactive application of civil laws.284 Those states recognize that
retroactive application of laws that adversely affect substantive or
vested rights violates due process guarantees because the due process
clause “safeguard[s] . . . interests in fundamental fairness (through
notice and fair warning) and the prevention of the arbitrary and vindictive use of the laws.” 285 Retroactive application of new parentage
rules created by the judiciary is equally unconstitutional.286
A decision by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in a child support
case is instructive.287 In that case, W.G.N., who was named as the
father of a child in a Michigan paternity suit brought by the mother,
settled the action by an agreement approved by a Michigan court in
1978.288 “The agreement, in which W.G.N. acknowledged paternity,
provided $1,000 for confinement and medical expenses of the mother
and a lump sum payment of $3,000 held in trust for the benefit of the
child . . . .” 289 The agreement also provided that all other remedies
for support and education of the child are “forever barred.” 290
In 1983, the mother petitioned a court in Wisconsin for appointment of a guardian ad litem to “initiate a support action on the child’s
behalf.” 291 After a child support action was filed, W.G.N. argued that
284. For a list of state cases analyzing retroactive civil laws under the Due Process
Clause, see, for example, 21st Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 479
n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Hurst, 949 So. 2d 279, 285 (Fla. Ct.
App. 2007); In re Marriage of Duggan, 877 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007); Town
of Eunice v. Childs, 205 So. 2d 897, 900 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Bereano v. State Ethics
Comm’n, 944 A.2d 538, 547 (Md. 2008); Town of Eureka v. State Eng’r of Nev., 826 P.2d
948, 951 (Nev. 1992); R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 716 A.2d 730, 735
(R.I. 1998); see also Starnes v. Cayouette, 419 S.E.2d 669, 674-75 (Va. 1992) (protecting
both substantive and vested rights from retroactive legislation).
285. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001).
286. Judicially created parentage definitions also violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ¶ 35, 154 P.3d 808 (“While the distinction between applying the law to unique situations and engaging in legislation is not always clear,
by asking us to recognize a new class of parents, Jones invites this court to overstep its
bounds and invade the purview of the legislature.”); Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419,
442 (Wis. 1995) (Day, J., concurring and dissenting) (“There is no justification for a court
to seek to impose in the name of the law, common or equitable, its own ideas of social policy
and a new found theory of family law which creates new ‘rights’ for those who have no
legally binding relationship to the child.”); see also S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 835
(Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (chastising lower court for having granted a same-sex adoption in
violation of Kentucky law through the “legal fiction” of treating the same-sex partner as
a step-parent, explaining that “[t]he function of the Judiciary is to answer the legal
question whether ‘stepparent-like’ adoptions are permitted under Kentucky law. Courts
are constitutionally prohibited from addressing the political question, ‘Why not?’ ”).
287. Weidner v. W.G.N., 371 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
288. Id. at 380.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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the Michigan agreement barred the action.292 The Wisconsin trial
court refused to give full faith and credit to the Michigan agreement.293 Affirming, the court of appeals explained that the Michigan
statute that authorized the settlement agreement in paternity actions
was unconstitutional and, therefore, did not require Wisconsin to
treat the agreement as valid.294 In particular, the Michigan statute,
which authorized agreements in paternity actions that bar future support obligations, is based on illegitimacy — an unwed mother seeking to establish paternity for her child.295 On appeal, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding “that
Michigan’s classification fails to bear an evident and substantial relation to its state interest.” 296 Insofar as “‘[a] judgment obtained in
violation of procedural due process is not entitled to full faith and
credit when sued upon in another jurisdiction[,]’ [w]e see no reason
to accord full faith and credit to a judgment obtained in violation of
equal protection.” 297
In the context of the Miller-Jenkins case, both Vermont and
Virginia prohibit retroactive application of laws that affect substantive
rights.298 Vermont law provides that “[a]cts of the general assembly,
except acts regulating practice in court, relating to the competency
of witnesses or to amendments of process or pleadings, shall not affect
a suit begun or pending at the time of their passage.” 299 Pursuant to
that statute, any legislative act after Miller filed suit in Vermont that
created a new rule to determine parentage of a child born via assisted
reproductive technology could not be applied to determine parentage
of Isabella.
Thus, if the legislature had passed a law during the pendency
of Miller’s case that was identical to the new rule created by the trial
court, it could not be retroactively applied to Miller’s case. The same
result should apply to judge-made law.300 The rationale underlying
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 380-81.
295. Id. at 380.
296. Id. at 381.
297. Id. (citation omitted).
298. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 213 (2009) (“Acts of the general assembly, except acts
regulating practice in court, relating to the competency of witnesses or to amendments
of process or pleadings, shall not affect a suit begun or pending at the time of their
passage.”); Potomac Hosp. Corp. v. Dillon, 329 S.E.2d 41, 44 (Va. 1985) (“[S]ubstantive
and vested rights are included within those interests protected from retroactive application
of statutes.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
299. § 213.
300. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964) (stating that the ex
post facto prohibition applies equally against the judiciary and the legislature); see also
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 470-74 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that to
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the prohibition of retroactive laws made by the legislature applies
equally to judge-made law: the aggrieved individual had no notice or
fair warning of the change in the law.301 The parties had structured
their lives around then-existing laws.302
The Vermont Parentage Order in Jenkins’s favor was based on
a new parentage rule created by the court. The court held “that where
a legally connected couple utilizes artificial insemination to have a
family, parental rights and obligations are determined by facts showing intent to bring a child into the world and raise the child as one’s
own as part of a family unit, not by biology.” 303 The court’s analysis
conceded that prior to the court’s decision no law existed to determine parentage of a child born by assisted reproductive technology.304
Prior to the court’s decision, a spouse in a marriage or partner in a
same-sex civil union would be presumed to be the parent of a child
born during the marriage or civil union.305 That presumption could be
rebutted with proof of no genetic link to the child.306 Thus, to protect
one’s status as a parent to a child born by assisted reproductive technology, the non-biological spouse or partner had to adopt the child
through second parent adoption procedures.307
the same extent retroactive legislation is unconstitutional, so too are retroactive judicial
pronouncements); Johnson v. State, 472 A.2d 1311, 1314 (Del. 1983) (determining whether
retroactive elimination of a prisoner’s good time credits violates ex post facto clause);
Syntex Labs. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 590 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
retroactive change in tax laws is permissible in this case although due process forbids
retroactive laws from divesting property rights or impairing contracts); State v. Goebel,
31 P.3d 340, 344-47 (Mont. 2001) (addressing retroactive application of statute concerning
probable cause hearing); State v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631, 640 (Neb. 2002) (discussing
constitutionality of retroactive application of statute removing malice as an element of
second degree murder); Price v. Beck, 571 S.E.2d 247, 251 (N.C. App. 2002) (sustaining
retroactive application of case law affecting prisoner’s parole eligibility); State v. Bruce,
170 Ohio App. 3d 92, 2007-Ohio-175, 866 N.E.2d 44, at ¶ 8 (allowing retroactive application
of case law that impacted defendant’s sentence); State v. Collins, 495 S.E.2d 202, 205 n.4
(S.C. 1998) (reversing defendant’s conviction for accessory after the fact of murder because
of retroactive application of change in required elements); Chalin v. State, 645 S.W.2d
265, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (reversing defendant’s conviction due to retroactive application of changed drug laws); State v. Hensler, 415 S.E.2d 885, 887 (W. Va. 1992) (rejecting
retroactive application of changes to elements for sexual assault).
301. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354-55 (explaining that retroactive application eliminates
fair warning regarding whether the “contemplated conduct” is legal).
302. See id. at 355 (observing that petitioners acted in a manner that was legal at the
time).
303. Vermont Parentage Order, supra note 73, at 11.
304. Id. at 9-10 (“The issue of parental status of a child conceived through artificial
insemination is one of first impression in Vermont.”).
305. Id. at 7-8.
306. See id. at 9 (refusing to find that genetics alone could overcome the presumption).
But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308 (2009) (creating presumption).
307. Cf. Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 687-88 (Vt. 1997) (declining to adopt de
facto parent or equitable adoption doctrines in case where former partner in a same-sex
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Finding that process unrealistic or unworkable, and not wanting to wait any longer for an acceptable legislative response, the court
created its own parentage rule.308 Thus, three and one-half years after
Isabella’s birth in Virginia, eleven months after Miller filed suit in
Vermont, and weeks after a Virginia court declared Miller the sole
parent to Isabella under Virginia’s assisted conception statute, the
Vermont trial court created a new parentage test and applied it to the
case before it to declare Jenkins a parent.309 That decision retroactively stripped Miller of her substantive parental rights. The PKPA
cannot be interpreted to require a state to give full faith and credit to
that order.
CONCLUSION
The debate over legal recognition of same-sex relationships has
been raging for years,310 and will likely continue to do so for years to
come. After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court redefined
marriage to include same-sex couples,311 an explosion of litigation
began that directly challenged as unconstitutional marriage laws
across the country.312 A separate battle strategy that garnered little
national attention, but which proved more successful, involved
relationship claimed parental status of a child adopted by the other woman during the
relationship because plaintiff could have adopted the child to protect her parental status).
308. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78, ¶ 52, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951
(“[T]he Legislature has not dealt directly with new reproductive technologies and the
families that result from those technologies. Nonetheless, the courts must define and
protect the rights and interests of the children that are part of these families.”).
309. Id. ¶ 56, 180 Vt. at 465, 912 A.2d at 970.
310. See, e.g., Tim Evans, Gay Couples’ Challenge Reaches Judge; State Seeks Dismissal
of Lawsuit Challenging Indiana’s Marriage Law, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 31, 2003, at
1A (discussing a case filed in Marion County by the Indiana Civil Liberties Union on
behalf of three same-sex couples challenging the state’s ban on gay marriage); Rachel S.
Garron & David C. Garron, Editorial, Marriage is a Contract, So Why Not Treat it That
Way?, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 16, 2001, at A15 (discussing the national debate about
gay marriage); Editorial, Shotgun Divorce: The House Rushes to Distance Itself from Gay
Marriage, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 17, 1996, at A18 (discussing the passage of
DOMA in the U.S. House of Representatives).
311. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963, 969 (Mass. 2003).
312. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Super. Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (finding
marriage laws constitutional); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008) (finding
marriage laws unconstitutional); Kerrigan v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481
(Conn. 2008) (finding civil union statute unconstitutional); O’Kelley v. Perdue, 632 S.E.2d
110, 113 (Ga. 2006) (finding marriage laws constitutional); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d
15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding marriage laws constitutional); Conaway v. Deane,
932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007) (finding marriage laws constitutional); Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (finding marriage laws unconstitutional); Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (finding marriage laws constitutional); Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963, 1010 (Wash. 2006) (finding marriage laws constitutional); see also
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (upholding constitutionality
of DOMA).
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indirect assaults on the states’ marriage laws. Thus, litigation took
place around the country that sought court orders either permitting
same-sex couples to adopt,313 or declaring legal strangers to be parents
to their former partners’ biological children.314 Armed with an order
conferring parental rights, one or both of the parties then sought to
export those orders to states that expressly prohibited recognition or
enforcement of same-sex relationships.315 Thus, as the Miller-Jenkins
litigation demonstrates, Vermont’s decision to fundamentally redefine
marriage and parentage was exported to Virginia by means of the
full faith and credit obligation, despite Virginia’s express prohibition
in its statutes and Constitution against recognition or enforcement
of any orders arising from same-sex relationships.316 Unless the
PKPA, DOMA, and Full Faith and Credit Act are interpreted as set
forth in this Article, core domestic relations matters will, in essence,
be federalized.
Not only is this sort of federalization of domestic relations laws
inconsistent with Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, but it
poses an immediate threat to the very concept of liberty on which this
nation is founded. The founders of this nation knew the dangers of
concentrating too much power in the centralized government and purposefully created a federal government of limited, enumerated powers:
This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s
structural protections of liberty. “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.” . . . “In the compound republic of America, the
power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.” 317
313. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827
(11th Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida’s ban on homosexual adoption); see also Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (declaring unconstitutional an Oklahoma
statute that denied recognition of same-sex adoptions).
314. See Lindevaldsen, supra note 3, at nn.107-08 and accompanying text (listing
cases decided in more than twenty-five states involving claims to visitation, custody, or
parentage rights on behalf of third parties).
315. Id.
316. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (defining marriage as only a union between a man
and a woman); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45.2 to .3 (2008) (prohibiting same-sex marriage and
civil unions).
317. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 921-22 (1997) (citations omitted); see also U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“This constitutionally mandated division of authority
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A proper understanding of federalism requires us to remember
that, as a nation made up of fifty individual states, there are constitutional limitations on the scope of the federal government’s powers:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in
the State governments are numerous and indefinite. . . . The
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the State.318

Because “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not
to the laws of the United States,” 319 the federal government has no
authority, through an unconstitutional application of the full faith
and credit obligation, to reduce the domestic relations policy of each
of the fifty states to that of a small handful of states that has chosen
to experiment with the father-mother parentage paradigm. Unfortunately, the first state in the nation to have addressed the full faith
and credit issue improperly ceded its state control over domestic
relations matters to Vermont and the federal government.

‘was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.’ ‘Just as
the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front.’ ”) (citations omitted).
318. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Signet Classic ed., 2003).
319. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 692 (1992).

